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Abstract
This work examines trends and developments of Italian household financial investments
before, during and after the Great Recession. We first of all document the very low
fraction of households that invest in the financial markets and how this fraction de-
clined strongly during the last 15 years. In order to explain these patterns, we focus on
the role of risk aversion, participation costs, trust and financial literacy in determining
risky investment attitudes. We provide a theoretical discussion of how these factors can
determine non participation and we address the issue empirically, by means of an econo-
metric analysis. Coherently with the literature and the predictions of the theory, we find
that poorer, lower educated and more risk averse households are less likely to hold risky
financial assets. They are also more likely to have exited the stock market following
the financial crisis of 2007-2008, possibly reflecting a loss in wealth, given the fixed
participation cost. We also conjecture that a decrease in the level of trust following the
financial crisis is a concurrent driver of the drop in participation and the main reason of
the exit of richer and better educated households.
i

Contents
Introduction 1
Macroeconomic developments in Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1 The microeconomic environment 15
1.1 Household portfolios over time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.2 The cross section of household portfolios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.3 An international comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2 The theory of household portfolio choice 47
2.1 Introducing participation costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.2 Portfolio choice and trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.3 Expectations, preferences and portfolio choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3 Empirical analysis 73
3.1 Econometric models of portfolio choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.2 Estimation results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.3 Accounting for stock market entry and exit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4 Concluding remarks 103
References 104
Appendix 111
iii
iv
List of Figures
1 Annual Real GDP growth rate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2 Unemployment rate by year. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3 Household final expenditure annual growth rate, in percent. Source: Istat. 9
4 Real residential property price indexes by country. . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5 Rate of return of government securities with different maturities. . . . . 11
1.1 Mean and median net wealth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.2 Mean net wealth composition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.3 Average financial portfolio composition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.4 Net wealth distribution in selected years. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.5 Asset participation by percentiles of total assets in 2014. . . . . . . . . 29
1.6 Average portfolio composition by net wealth quartiles. . . . . . . . . . 29
1.7 Fraction of stock market participants by age and cohort, in percent. . . . 32
1.8 Estimated age profiles for risky asset ownership using different SHIW
waves. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.9 Participation rates in risky assets by year, net wealth quartile and edu-
cation attainment of the reference person, in percent. . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.10 Homeownership rate by country, in percent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1.11 Net wealth composition by country, in percent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
1.12 Participation rates in risky asset by country and deciles of total assets. . 44
1.13 Unconditional share (top) and conditional share (bottom) invested in
risky asset by country and deciles of total assets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.1 Stock market participation benefits for nonparticipants. . . . . . . . . . 52
2.2 Cumulative density function of the participation cost. . . . . . . . . . . 55
v
2.3 Simulation of optimal asset allocation with different levels of trust and
risk aversion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.4 Trust, the wealth threshold and the optimal share. . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.6 P25-P75 range and median level of risk aversion inferred with the re-
vealed preference approach, by country. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.7 Composition of self-reported risk aversion by participation status in
risky assets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.9 Correlation between average self reported risk aversion (y-axis) and
risky asset participation rate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.10 The correlation between average self reported risk aversion and home
ownership rate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.11 Risk aversion over time in Italy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.1 Participation rates and median net wealth by working status and year. . 90
3.3 Conditional probabilities of entry and exit, by net wealth quartiles. . . . 98
3.5 Conditional probabilities of entry and exit, by education level of the
reference person. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.7 Conditional probabilities of entry and exit, by age of the reference person.100
vi
List of Tables
1.1 Household composition and demographic characteristics, in percent. . . 18
1.2 Participation rates in percent. Statistics computed using survey weights. 22
1.3 Asset shares in household portfolios, in percent. Statistics computed
using survey weights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.4 Inequality measures for net wealth and income. Statistics computed
using survey weights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.5 Participation rate and mean conditional share in risky liquid financial
assets invested by household characteristics, in percent. Individual char-
acteristics refer to the household head. Statistics computed using survey
weights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.6 Participation rates by country, in percent. Statistics computed using
survey weights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.7 Asset shares in household portfolios by country, in percent. Statistics
computed using survey weights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.1 Fixed costs needed to explain the decision of x% of nonparticipants. . . 53
3.1 Panel dimension in the SHIW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.2 Pooled logistic regressions for risky liquid assets. . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.3 Logistic regressions for risky liquid assets ownership. . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.4 Logistic regressions for risky assets ownership. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.5 Transition probabilities for risky liquid assets ownership across the years. 94
3.6 Bivariate participation probit, 2006-2010. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.7 Bivariate participation probit, 2010-2014. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
vii
viii
Introduction
Household portfolios started drawing researchers’ attention during the ’90s. Since then,
a large literature has developed, focused on understanding the drivers of household fi-
nancial decisions. Campbell (2006) in his presidential address to the American Eco-
nomic Association, coined the term "household finance" to define the branch of eco-
nomics devoted to study how households use financial instruments to attain their objec-
tives. The development of the field has been sustained by the increasing availability of
household level comprehensive data on income, consumption, wealth and its composi-
tion. Moreover, interest in the topic has been driven by the significant expansion of the
set of financial saving instruments available to households during the ’90s. Households
participation in the stock market, either directly or indirectly through managed invest-
ment accounts, increased significantly, both in Europe and the United States. Guiso et al.
(2002b) refers to this as the "the phenomenon of the spread of the equity culture". They
point out three factors that have been especially important: increasing competition in
the financial sector, privatization of public utilities and pension reforms. In addition to
these public policies, further incentives for the households to invest in the stock market
came from the financial sector itself. Maybe due to the pressure of growing competition,
and certainly thanks to technological innovations, financial intermediaries expanded the
set of services offered in order to attract new customers. With the diffusion of mutual
funds, even small investors could invest in a diversified portfolio, managed profession-
ally. Lastly, we want to point out that the unprecedented stock market boom experienced
during the ’90s in almost all Western countries has probably been a further incentive to
invest in equity, given that, at the same time, interest rates fell significantly, especially
in Europe.
Such transformation of household portfolios has been very evident also in Italy.
Guiso and Jappelli (2002) reports how the participation rate to the stock market of Ital-
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ian households had traditionally been low, compared to other industrialized economies.
The median household financial savings were typically in the form of transaction ac-
counts and short term government bonds, and its portfolio poorly diversified. After
the complete liberalization of capital movements, and the privatization of many public
companies during the ’80s and 90’s the fraction of households holding stocks rose from
4.5% in 1989 to 7.3% in 1998. Similarly, participation rate in mutual funds increased
from 2.8% to 10.6%. Such trends were so striking that Guiso and Jappelli (2002) in
their analysis state that "although some of these features [regarding low participation]
remain, it appears that Italian households are now in the course of a transition that will
lead to a configuration more closely resembling other advanced industrial economies".
However, such trend stopped abruptly after the stock market crash of 2001. Between
2002 and 2014 there has been a steady decline in the fraction of households participating
to the stock market, both directly and indirectly through mutual funds. Moreover, the
gap in participation between Italy and other advanced economies has remained wide.
This thesis investigates Italian households attitude towards risky financial invest-
ment. In particular, there are two questions that we address: first, why investment in
risky assets is so limited in Italy compared to other advanced economies? Second,
which are the factors that have caused such a strong reversal in the upward trend of the
late 1990s? The former question has been widely investigated in the literature. A large
fraction of the households, indeed, do not own stocks neither directly nor indirectly.
Such feature has been largely documented both in Europe and in the United States,
and has become known as the stock market participation puzzle (Haliassos and Bertaut,
1995). The "puzzle" comes from the fact that, in the presence of a positive equity pre-
mium and in the absence of frictions, each expected utility maximizing investor should
hold equity. In the literature, many different factors have been considered in order to
explain the puzzle. A popular explanation relies on participation costs. In her seminal
contribution, Vissing-Jørgensen (2004) shows that if investors face a fixed cost to invest
in the stock market, such cost would determine a wealth threshold below which invest-
ing is not optimal. Thus, fixed costs are able to explain the strong correlation between
financial wealth and stock market participation. However, only a fraction of households
participate even at high levels of wealth. This issue can be partly addressed if we con-
sider two components of participation cost: a monetary component, that may represent
fees or other transaction costs, and an heterogeneous, non monetary component, cor-
2
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responding to the time and efforts (opportunity costs) needed in order to acquire the
knowledge and the information necessary to invest. In this way the participation cost
explanation can also rationalize the correlation between stock market participation and
financial literacy (van Rooij et al., 2011). Indeed, investors with a limited knowledge
of financial markets and investment opportunities may need to spend more time and
efforts in order to acquire the information they need. However, there are two features
of the data that are difficult to reconcile with this explanation: first, even if these costs
are heterogenous, to justify the non participation of rich and literate households they
should be extremely high. Second, participation costs are unlikely to have increased
during the last 15 years in Italy, thus they are unlikely to have caused the drop in the
participation rate. A third evidence that cannot be explained considering only participa-
tion costs relates to the wide cross country heterogeneity in stock market participation.
The fixed participation costs story cannot account for such differences, unless we as-
sume that there are also extreme differences in the level of these costs by country. Such
assumption seems clearly implausible.
In order to explain these patterns, the literature explored other hypotheses. A first
one, on which we will focus in chapter two, is that many households do not participate
due to a lack of trust in the financial system. The correlation between trust and stock
market participation has been emphasized by Guiso et al. (2008). They develop a model
in which trust is modelled as a subjective probability of being cheated in the stock
market. Given fixed participation costs, a decrease in the level of trust increases the
wealth threshold and decreases the optimal share upon investment. Hence, trust can
explain the low participation rate of the wealthy, and at the same time, if it has changed
during the years, it can also provide an explanation of the decline in the participation rate
over the years. Guiso et al. (2008) show also that there is a high correlation between the
level of trust measured by the World Value Survey and the participation rate observed at
the country level. Thus, trust as a cultural factor can explain also the large differences
in household risk taking behaviour in different countries.
However, we also analyze alternative explanations. In particular, we take into ac-
count the fact that households may have reduced their investment in risky assets as a
consequence of an increase of the background risks to which they are exposed. Bottazzi
et al. (2006) show how the long reformation effort of the public pension system has
increased household expected retirement age and lowered expected replacement rate.
3
They also find a partial substitution effect of pension wealth and private wealth, and
that households with lower expectations about future pension wealth tend to accumu-
late more wealth. In a second study, Bottazzi et al. (2011) focus on the portfolio effect
of these pension reforms. Once again, they find that the response has been stronger
among individuals that have lower expectations about their future. Overall, households
responded by increasing their wealth invested in safe assets and real estates. How-
ever, Bottazzi et al. (2011) do not find significant effects on stock market participation.
Overall, their results seem suggesting that background risk related to pension wealth
expectations is unlikely to be the main cause of the reduction in risky investments. An-
other source of background risk can also be income uncertainty. As shown by Gollier
(2002), income risk may lead to a larger share invested in the risk free assets. Taking
into account income risk may explain the decline in participation after 2007, and espe-
cially after 2012, when unemployment increased dramatically. But, although between
2002 and 2007 unemployment was declining, we still see a decline in the participation
rate in those years. A third source of background risk considered in the literature is the
substantial share of wealth invested in housing. In most industrialized economies, home
ownership rates exceed the 50%. Moreover, the main residence typically represents the
bulk of household wealth, with average shares ranging from 50 to 70%. Since the sem-
inal contribution by Grossman and Laroque (1990) many studies predicted that housing
should reduce household demand for risky assets, since it increases household exposure
to risk and illiquidity. Cocco (2005) proposes a life cycle model in which households
optimize their expected utility from consumption and can invest in housing, risk-free
and risky financial assets. In his framework, investing heavily in housing reduces finan-
cial wealth, thus lowering the potential benefit from stock market investing, and may
lead to non participation. He finds also that house price risk crowds out stock holding,
especially for what concerns households with low financial wealth.
One last factor that is worth mentioning in this discussion is the role of expectations
about the stock market return and volatility. Clearly, lower expected return and higher
volatility reduce the risk-adjusted equity premium, lowering the incentive to invest in
risky assets. There has been significant recent work about measuring and interpreting
household expectations about equity returns and stock market volatility1. Using sub-
1See Manski (2004) for a discussion about how to measure and interpret household expectations
in a survey context. He shows that responses to probabilistic expectations questions are predictive for
4
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jective probabilities of the likelihood of positive equity returns elicited in the Survey
of Economic Expectations Dominitz and Manski (2011) postulate the presence of three
different types of households, on the basis of their expectations. One is the random
walk type, which assumes that returns are i.i.d. over time and uses the historical mean
return to predict future returns. Then, they distinguish between a persistence type, who
thinks that recent trends will persist over time, and, conversely, a mean reversion type,
who predicts that recent trends will reverse in the future. Concerning the Italian case,
expectations of persistence may explain the increased participation during the boom and
the drop in participation that followed the 2001 and 2008 stock market crashes. Unfor-
tunately, questions on expected returns have not been asked consistently throughout the
years in the Survey on Household Income and Wealth that we use in this thesis and they
are available only for the post-crisis period, that is, in 2008, 2010 and 2012. Moreover,
there are issues with the quality of the data. Many households do not answer to the
questions, or give inconsistent answers. We observe also a large fraction of households
that report to attach a zero probability to a positive return of the stock market in the
following years. We conjecture that this is due to a combination of poor understanding
of the questions and a deep lack of trust in the stock market. Such issues, unfortunately,
limit our possibilities of analysis; anyway, the role of expectations needs to be kept in
mind.
Our empirical analysis addresses both the issue of the scarce participation in the
stock market and the issue of the decline in participation over the years. Regarding the
former, we estimate the likelihood of holding risky assets through a static logit spec-
ification. Given the availability of panel data, we employ different specifications in
order to account for individual unobservable effects. Our approach is closely related to
Miniaci and Weber (2002). We compare the results of a pooled logit model in which the
unobservable heterogeneity is assumed negligible with those of two models in which
such heterogeneity is treated as a fixed and a random effect. Consistently with their
results, we find that poorer, lower educated and more risk averse households are less
likely to participate in the stock market. Moreover, participation is hump shaped over
the life cycle, and differs broadly by geographic area, with the likelihood of owning
risky assets that is much lower for households resident in the south. Also the relation-
ship between the three models is similar to what reported in Miniaci and Weber (2002).
behavior.
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The coefficients estimated from the pooled logit model and the random effect model are
similar in sign and magnitude, but a likelihood ratio strongly rejects the null hypothesis
of zero serial correlation of the error term within households. Regarding the logit model
with fixed effect, or conditional logit, we face the same difficulties they report in esti-
mating the coefficients of variables that change little over time, such as age and family
composition.
The models described above share the assumption that the idiosyncratic error terms
are serially uncorrelated over time. Thus, they are static models and do not allow to
consider the relationship of current ownership status and past ownership. In principle,
this relationship could be taken into account in dynamic panel data models. However,
the estimation of dynamic panel data models presents two crucial issues: it requires
assumptions on the initial conditions of the process and it usually requires long time
series in order to distinguish between true and spurious state dependence (Miniaci and
Weber, 2002). In order to avoid these issues, we follow Bilias et al. (2010) and resort
to a bivariate probit model to estimate jointly the probability of participating in two
consecutive periods. The analysis estimates first of all a strong correlation between past
and actual ownership status, on the order of 0.6, thus confirming the need to account
jointly for both decisions. The results on the determinants of stockholding are in line
with the predictions of the static models. We then focus on entry, exit and inertia in
stock market participation. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics for the
periods 1994-1999 and 1999-2004, Bilias et al. (2010) find a strong inertia in ownership
status. We instead find that inertia is less prevalent in Italy, and that households at
each level of wealth and education have significant probabilities to exit the stock market
during the periods 2006-2010 and 2010-2014. Conversely, the probabilities of entering
is very low. Thus, inertia is strongly prevalent among non participants, but much less
common among participants. Consistently with the estimates in Bilias et al. (2010), we
find that the probability of exit (entry) decreases (increases) with wealth, income and
education.
We argue that a drop in wealth led to the decrease in participation of poorer house-
holds, given the fixed participation cost. We conjecture that the decline in the participa-
tion of richer and better educated households is due to a decrease in the level of trust.
However, due to the scarcity of the data on trust and expectations, and the difficulty of
measuring background risk, we cannot disentangle these factors, and assess their indi-
6
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vidual importance.
The thesis is organized as follows. The rest of this introduction presents some
macroeconomic trends as a background for the following analysis. Chapter one is de-
voted to the analysis of the evolution of household portfolios over time and their cross
sectional features. It also includes an international comparison between Italian house-
hold portfolios and the evidence from other European countries and the United States.
Chapter two introduces the stock holding puzzle, and presents the theoretically expla-
nations developed by the literature. In particular, the focus is on participation costs and
trust. We simulate a portfolio choice model that includes both factors, and we analyze
the predictions of the model in terms of participation and share invested upon participa-
tion. Chapter three is devoted to the empirical estimations. In the last chapter four we
draw our conclusions.
Macroeconomic developments in Italy
Before analysing the evidence from household level survey data, it may be useful to fo-
cus on the trends of the main macroeconomic indicators of the Italian economy during
the last two decades. First of all, these years saw a very sluggish economic growth in
Italy, and today the real GDP is very close to the value it had at the end of the last cen-
tury. Figure 1 shows the annual real gross domestic product growth rate. As can be seen,
growth has been relatively low between 1997 and 2006 and collapsed in the following
ten years, in which the Italian economy has been hit by the financial crisis in 2007-2008
and by the sovereign debt crisis in 2011-2012. Italy has been particularly affected espe-
cially by the latter crisis due to the fragility of its banking system and its heavy burden
of public debt. Years 2014 and 2015 saw a very mild recovery of the Italian economy,
especially relative to the other Euro area economies. Households have been particularly
hit during the 2011-2012 crisis. Figure 2 shows the unemployment rate in the period
2001-2015 for the whole working age population, and for the age classes 15-24 and
25-34 years old. The aggregate unemployment rate reached its lowest level in 2006,
slightly above 6%, and then increased steadily between 2007 and 2014. It increased by
two percentage points between 2007 and 2011. Afterwards, the increase has been about
two percentage points per year in 2012 and 2013, and the unemployment rate reached
12.7%. Youngest households have been disproportionally affected, with the unemploy-
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Figure 1: Annual Real GDP growth rate.
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Figure 2: Unemployment rate by year.
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ment rate in 2014 as high as 42.7% and 18.6% for workers in the 15-24 and 25-34 age
groups, respectively. The surge in unemployment has been accompanied by a strong
contraction of households aggregate expenditure, as can be seen in figure 3. Intuitively,
aggregate consumption and GDP are closely correlated. The drop in consumption is
particularly strong in 2008-2009, and especially in 2012, when it dropped by almost
four percentage points.
Figure 3: Household final expenditure annual growth rate, in percent. Source: Istat.
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Celidoni et al. (2016) show that the drop in consumption has been particularly strong
for younger households and it is only partially explained by the worsening of the labour
market conditions.
For what concerns asset prices, which play an important role in generating fluctua-
tions in household wealth, figure 4 show the evolution of real property prices in various
Euro area countries and in the United States. As can be seen there is wide heterogeneity
in the dynamics of house prices across countries. The boom-bust cycle in some Euro
area country is much stronger than in the United States. The magnitude of the increase
in real house prices in Spain and, to a lesser extent, in France and Ireland is striking. We
notice also that the bust has been very strong in Ireland and Spain, while prices remained
9
at very high levels in France. Although with different magnitudes, such boom-bust pat-
tern is common to almost all countries, with the exception of Germany and Austria, in
which we do not observe an increase in the first half of the 2000s, and Belgium, in which
instead prices continued to grow even during and after the crises. We notice also that
in 2007 house prices started to decline some quarters earlier in the U.S. than in Europe.
Moreover, for some countries such as Italy and the Netherlands, the drop in house prices
has been only mild before 2011-2012, and it became larger afterwards.
Figure 4: Real residential property price indexes by country.
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We want to conclude this section presenting some statistics relative to the financial
markets. Figure 5 shows the interest rate paid on government Treasury Bills with 12
months maturity and bonds with 10 years maturity, starting from 1991. We first of all
notice the strong decline in the interest rates occurred during the ’90s. At the beginning
of the ’90s, interest rates were very high in Italy. Combined with the heavy burden of
government debt, they made the country very vulnerable. The country entered a mone-
tary crisis, and the interest rates went up in response to strong devaluation pressure on
the lira. Italy was in the end unable to keep the fixed exchange rate, and the monetary
crisis led to the exit from the European Monetary System, that since 1979 had estab-
10
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Figure 5: Rate of return of government securities with different maturities.
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lished a fixed regime for the exchange rates. In the second half of the ’90s, thanks to the
efforts to stabilize public finance, and the establishment of the monetary union, interest
rates declined substantially.
From the figure we can gauge the magnitude of the sovereign debt crisis in Italy.
The interest rate paid on 12 months treasury bills peaked at 6.08% in November 2011,
while it was just 1.97% in April. After that, in the chart it is very evident the effect of
the loose monetary policies conducted by the ECB, and in particular after January 2015,
with the beginning of quantitative easing and the monthly purchase of public (and, in
a following phase, also private) bonds. Since March 2015 the rate paid by the Italian
government has been below 1%, and it became negative after November 2015.
Finally, we look at the stock market performance. The stock market in Italy has
been traditionally thin and relatively illiquid compared to other advanced economies.
However, since the ’80s it underwent a process of development and transformation,
partly as a consequence of the process of privatization of public companies that started
in the ’80s, with their subsequent listing on the market. Then, after 1995, it boomed:
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(a) Annual series of the Italian nominal stock index.
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(b) Monthly FTSE MIB and Standard and Poor’s indices.
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as can be seen in figure 6a2 at the beginning of the new millennium the value of the
stock index was almost 10 times its value in 1980. Guiso and Jappelli (2002) show
that between 1989 and 1998 the fraction of people investing directly in stocks almost
doubled, while the number of households investing in mutual funds or holding corporate
bonds increased from 2.84% to more than 10%, and from 1 to 6%, respectively. After
the burst of the "dot-com" bubble in 2001-2002, another period of very high growth
started, and the FTSE MIB index reached its historical peak in 2007, before the collapse
that followed the financial crisis.
Figure 6b compares the monthly series of the FTSE MIB index with the Standard
and Poor’s index for the U.S. for the last twenty years. Both series are normalized to
100 at the beginning in December 1997. From the figure it is clear that the two indices
have been strongly correlated until 2009, even though the Italian index presents a higher
volatility. After 2010, however, the paths of the two series do not seem to be correlated
anymore, with the Standard and Poor’s that recovered and reached historical maxima,
while the FTSE MIB is even today far below the level it was in 1997.
2Information on the dataset can be found in Jordà et al. (2016).
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1The microeconomic environment
This chapter will present evidences on household portfolios from three main sources of
data: the Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) conducted by the Bank of
Italy, the Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption Survey1 (HFCS) conducted
by the European Central Bank (of which also the SHIW is part) and the Survey of Con-
sumer Finance (SCF) run by the Federal reserve Board of Governors. The three datasets
share a similar structure, and provide detailed information on sociodemographic charac-
teristics, income and wealth composition. The SHIW began in 1960s, but single waves
are available on a consistent basis since 1987. In our study, we focus on nine waves
collected with biannual frequency from 1998 to 2014. On average, the SHIW collect
information on 8,000 households in each wave and has a panel component whose size
increased throughout the years. We will exploit it in our empirical application. Faiella
and Gambacorta (2007) provide an in depth description of the survey design and the
weighting process. The sample is drawn in two stages, municipality and households.
In the first stage, municipalities are stratified by region and size and are divided into
self representing units if the number of inhabitants exceeds 40,000 people, and non self
representative units. Then, households are drawn randomly within the municipalities.
Weights are adjusted in order to accounts for different features of the survey. First of
all, weights account for the survey design, and represent the inverse of the probability
to be drawn, for each household. Secondly, non response is not random in the SHIW
and is more frequent among wealthy households. This is a well known issue that arises
1An in depth description of the survey methodological aspects can be found in Eurosystem Household
Finance and Consumption Network (2016a) while a presentation of the second wave results is given in
Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption Network (2016b)
15
1. THE MICROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
in survey context. The set of weights provided in the SHIW account also for the non
response process. Thirdly, some corrections are needed for panel households. Weights
are corrected in order to consider attrition in the panel and the autocorrelation in income
and wealth observed for panel households. Finally, weights are adjusted to replicate
the same characteristics as the population in terms of sex, age, municipality size and
geographical area.
Section one and two of this chapter focus on Italian households, and describe the
main trends over time in household portfolios as well as their main cross sectional fea-
tures. Section three provides an international comparison, in which we exploit two other
data sources: the second wave HFCS dataset and the 2013 SCF. The HFCS is an har-
monised survey coordinated by the European Central Bank and it is representative at
the Euro area level. Two waves have been collected so far, with reference periods corre-
sponding to approximatively 2009-2010 and 2013-2014. The second wave is available
since December 2016, and provides detailed data on demographic characteristics, in-
come and wealth for more than 80,000 households in all the Euro Area countries except
Lithuania, plus Hungary and Poland. There are still differences across countries re-
garding the reference periods2 and especially the degree of oversampling of wealthy
households. Such differences are due to the fact that, when possible, the HFCS ex-
ploited already established surveys, such as the Italian SHIW (in which no ovesampling
takes place) or the Spanish EFF (in which, instead, oversampling is extensive) 3. Yet,
it is a unique data source for researchers and policymakers, that allows to study Euro
area households as a whole. The only survey comparable in terms of coverage is the
Survey on Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), that however includes
only households aged more than 50.
The SCF is one of the most intensively used household level dataset and it is avail-
able in a consistent format since 1983. It is run with a three year frequency by the
2Reference period in the HFCS is mainly 2013-2014, with the exception of Spain for which data refer
to 2011. Specifically, the reference period is 2014 for Belgium, Germany, Austria, Italy and France. Data
for the Netherlands and Ireland refer to 2013.
3Vermeulen (2014) provides an overview on the differential under reporting within the HFCS, given
the substantial cross country differences in the methods used to oversample wealthy households. Further
work by Vermeulen (2016) estimates the top tail of the wealth distribution in different countries and
provide insights on the magnitude of this problem in different countries. Italy, Austria and Germany are
the countries in which the wealth of the top 1% is more underestimated. Moreover, he shows that under
reporting is much stronger for financial than real assets.
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Federal Reserve Board of Governors and is probably the best data source on American
household portfolios. With respect to other sources, such as the PSID or the HRS, the
SCF is characterized by the high oversampling of wealthy households, that allows it to
be representative also of the very rich households 4. Both the HFCS and the SCF resort
to multiple imputation to estimate missing answers; hence, in computing statistics, we
will take this into account following the methodologies in Rubin (2004).
1.1 Household portfolios over time
This first section is devoted to the description of he evolution of Italian household port-
folios over time. In first place, it is useful to look at how the socio demographic charac-
teristics changed in the SHIW during the last decades. The entire following discussion
will be based on variables aggregated at the household level. It is straightforward that
family structure is crucial for decisions regarding consumption, wealth allocation and
labour supply. Thus, demographic changes have a strong effect in shaping the evolution
of household wealth, income and consumption.
In table 1.1 we present the summary of the sample demographic characteristics
throughout the years. All the information at the individual level (sex, age, education,
work status) are referred to the reference person. To have more homogeneity we always
consider the husband or male partner as reference person, in order to reduce spurious
variability in household head’s characteristics over time, since the recording practices
changed over time.
During the last decades, fertility rate in Italy decreased dramatically and population
ageing is very evident in the sample: there is a steady increase in the proportion of
households with reference person aged 70 or more and an almost proportional decrease
of young households, younger than 40 years old. At the same time, average household
size decreased during the observed period, with a rise in the number of single households
and couples. Throughout the years we can observe a strong reduction in the percentage
of households whose head has no formal education or less than the compulsory level
of schooling. Indeed, this share goes from 37.9 % in 1998 to 24.0% in 2014. At the
same time, we observe an increase in the fraction of households with secondary or
4For a description of the SCF and the oversampling that takes place in it, see Kennickell (2005)
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Table 1.1: Household composition and demographic characteristics, in percent.
Year 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
All Households 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sex
Male 77.7 77.6 77.0 75.7 75.8 75.0 74.2 71.9 70.9
Female 22.3 22.4 23.0 24.3 24.2 25.0 25.8 28.1 29.1
Age
<25 4.5 4.4 3.6 4.6 4.1 4.6 4.0 3.8 3.6
26-40 28.1 28.8 28.7 28.9 28.3 27.5 26.1 25.2 22.7
41-55 29.7 28.5 28.2 28.0 28.4 27.7 28.9 28.5 30.1
56-70 26.9 26.2 26.6 25.4 24.5 25.6 25.7 26.2 26.1
70+ 10.8 12.1 12.9 13.0 14.7 14.7 15.3 16.4 17.5
Education
No education/Primary 37.9 37.1 36.2 33.1 29.8 28.3 25.6 25.1 24.0
Secondary 54.4 54.8 56.1 58.7 61.3 62.1 63.3 63.7 63.3
Tertiary 7.7 8.2 7.7 8.2 9.0 9.7 11.1 11.2 12.7
Household size
1 19.5 20.2 22.1 24.6 24.9 26.4 24.9 28.3 29.3
2 26.0 27.5 26.2 28.0 28.4 29.2 30.4 27.9 27.3
3 23.6 23.0 22.1 21.2 21.5 20.1 19.5 19.4 19.3
4 22.3 21.4 21.8 19.6 18.5 18.0 18.7 17.7 17.8
5+ 8.7 7.9 7.7 6.6 6.7 6.3 6.5 6.7 6.3
Number of income recipients
1 44.0 46.0 47.8 49.6 48.3 48.8 47.8 53.1 53.2
2 41.9 40.8 40.0 39.4 40.6 41.0 43.0 38.6 38.0
3+ 14.0 13.2 12.2 11.0 11.1 10.2 9.1 8.2 8.8
Housing status
Owner outright 60.7 62.7 61.9 59.6 60.9 58.7 58.3 56.6 58.2
Owner with mortgage 5.7 6.3 7.1 8.5 8.2 10.7 10.4 10.9 10.1
Renter 22.8 20.9 20.9 21.7 20.9 21.3 21.1 21.8 20.7
Usufruct or free 10.8 10.1 10.1 10.2 10.0 9.3 10.2 10.8 11.1
Work status
Employee 36.9 38.0 38.2 40.7 41.6 41.6 41.2 40.5 39.5
Self Employed 14.4 13.8 13.9 12.7 12.2 11.8 12.2 10.8 10.6
Retired 41.9 42.3 42.3 40.9 41.3 42.0 40.7 40.5 40.4
Other not working 6.8 5.8 5.6 5.7 4.9 4.6 5.9 8.1 9.5
Region of residence
North 48.0 46.8 46.6 47.7 48.4 48.1 48.4 48.7 47.4
Center 19.1 19.6 19.9 20.3 19.9 21.0 19.9 18.9 20.2
South and islands 32.9 33.5 33.5 32.0 31.7 30.8 31.6 32.4 32.4
Individual characteristics refer to the household head. Statistics computed using survey weights.
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compulsory schooling (63.3% in 2014) and in particular in the share of those with a
university degree, from 7.7% in 1998 to 12.7% in 2014.
In table 1.1 is very evident the huge unemployment shock that hit Italian households
during and after the 2011-2012 recession following the sovereign debt crisis. Indeed,
in 2012 and 2014 we observe an increase in the share of families with only one source
of income, that peaks in 2014 at 53.2%. However, it should be remembered that this
is in part due to the decrease in average household size, a trend reflected in the steady
reduction of the families with three or more income recipients. The magnitude of the
unemployment shock can also be gauged from the statistics relative to the working status
of the reference person. The fraction of not working (and not retired) decreased steadily
from 1998 to reach 4.6% in 2008, but then it rose up to 9.6% in 2014. Another striking
evidence regards the number of self employed household heads, which were 14.4% of
the sample in the 1998 wave and just 10.6% in 2014.
Finally, table 1.1 presents the statistics related to the status of the main residence.
First of all, as we will see later, Italian households have typically been characterize by
a high home ownership rate by international comparison. The fraction of homeowners
(as the sum of owners outright and with mortgage) has changed slightly throughout the
years observed, between 67 and 69%. However, the composition of this group changed:
the share of outright home owners decreased, reaching 56.6 % in 2012, while at the same
time, there has been a strong rise in the number of households with a mortgage on their
main residence. Such share almost doubled during the period observed, from 5.7% in
1998 to almost 11% in 2012. There are at least two reasons that may help in explaining
such pattern in the share of indebted home owners. First of all, as we will discuss more
in depth in the following, it may be seen in the light of the long run trend of financial
development and increasing availability of financial products already highlighted by
Guiso and Jappelli (2002) in their analysis on the SHIW waves of the ’90s. Second, as
we have seen in figure 5 the low interest rates that followed the entrance in the monetary
union reduced the burden of interest payments, making it more convenient to buy a
house through debt.
Figure 1.1 shows the level of median and mean real net wealth over the years. From
the chart it is evident how wealth increased steadily up to 2006 and then it slightly
decreased in 2008. Then it peaked in 2010 and subsequently drop significantly in 2012
and 2014, almost going back to the values of early 2000s. It is especially evident the
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Figure 1.1: Mean and median net wealth.
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difference in the magnitude of the impact of the two crises, the financial crisis of 2007-
2008 and the sovereign debt crisis of 2011-2012. As we have seen before, the effects of
the latter have been much stronger.
In the literature it is well known that household portfolios are very simple and not
much diversified (see (Guiso et al., 2002a), (Campbell, 2006) or more recent evidences
from (Campbell, 2016), among others). Table 1.2 shows the participation rate for de-
tailed categories of debt and real and financial assets. As one would expect, deposits
in the form of checking and saving accounts are the most widespread item, with a par-
ticipation rate increasing throughout the years reaching 93.2% in 2014. Such increase
highlight the process of financial development and access to financial instruments that
took place in Italy in the last decades. Remarkably, however, even in 2014 there is al-
most a 7% of households that do not own an account. It is interesting to note that at the
end of the ’90s the most participated items were government bonds and life insurance.
Guiso and Jappelli (2002) show that government bonds, especially with a short maturity,
traditionally represented the most common saving instruments for Italian households,
and they report that in 1989 the participation rate in this category was higher than 25%.
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This was also due to the high interest rates paid by the government during the ’80s.
During our sample period the participation to government bonds decreased steadily, and
in 2012 only 4.3% of households hold short term government bonds.
Table 1.2 reports also the statistics related to the participation to the stock mar-
ket. First of all, such participation may be direct or indirect, through mutual funds and
managed accounts. Participation to the stock market (direct or indirect) peaked in 2000-
2002, with more or less 9% of households directly holding shares of listed companies
and 11% holding stocks indirectly through mutual funds. Afterwards, these rates de-
clined substantially, and in 2014 only 3.6% of Italian families holds stocks of listed
Italian firms. Similarly, only 6.8% of households participates in mutual funds in 2014.
However, investment in mutual funds may be characterized by very different degrees of
riskiness, as the availability of funds ranges from monetary and liquidity funds to more
aggressive equity funds.
Turning to more illiquid forms of savings, the evolution of participation rates in life
insurance products and voluntary pension funds is one of the most evident transforma-
tions occurred to Italian household portfolios during the sample period. Indeed, in 1998
life insurance policies were surprisingly widespread, with more than 20% of the sample
owning one or more of such policies. Such rate declined fast, especially between 2002
and 2004, and reached 8.5% in 2014. For what regards pension plans, instead, the pat-
tern is opposite, with an increase over the years. Particularly significant is the increase
between 2008 and 2010, when the participation rate almost doubled. In order to explain
such evolution, it is necessary to refer to the process of reformation that interested the
Italian pension system, started in 1992 with the Amato reform and continued through-
out the year with the Dini reform (1995) and, finally, the Monti reform in 2011. Such
reformation effort was mainly due to public finance consideration. The Italian pension
system was traditionally very generous, based on a defined benefit structure and fea-
turing high replacement rate and substantial benefits and generous provisions for early
retirement. Such generosity, combined with a population that was ageing, made the
social security system clearly unsustainable at the end of the ’90s. The reforms were
thus aimed to reduce the burden for public finance and to ensure long term stability
to the system. Such process imposed a substantial reduction of expected replacement
rates and increased the need for saving for retirement of Italian households. Attanasio
and Brugiavini (2003) estimate how indeed the 1992 reform has been followed by an
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Table 1.2: Participation rates in percent. Statistics computed using survey weights.
Year 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Financial assets
Transaction and savings accounts 85.6 85.0 85.7 85.9 89.2 89.0 91.6 92.8 93.2
Certificates of deposits 3.7 2.0 1.2 1.0 1.3 1.8 2.5 1.6 1.8
Postal saving certificates 5.9 5.4 4.8 5.7 5.9 6.0 5.3 5.6 5.4
Short term government bonds 1 9.0 9.8 7.5 5.3 6.8 7.5 6.1 4.3 5.2
Long term government bonds 2 5.6 4.4 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.1 3.3 3.6
Other bonds 5.1 5.7 6.0 5.7 6.4 7.0 8.2 7.1 6.8
Mutual funds 9.6 11.6 10.8 8.1 7.7 6.3 6.2 4.6 5.9
Listed shares 7.1 9.2 9.0 6.8 5.8 5.6 4.5 3.9 3.6
Non listed shares 1.5 1.2 1.0 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8
Managed accounts 2.7 2.9 2.0 1.8 1.4 1.3 1.5 2.2 0.9
Life insurance 23.6 19.9 18.0 12.6 13.8 13.5 11.4 9.7 8.5
Voluntary pension 7.9 12.0 8.6 8.1 8.3 8.7 15.7 13.2 13.2
Other financial assets 3 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.6 2.3 2.0 2.1 2.5 1.7
Real assets
Main residence 66.4 69.0 69.0 68.1 69.0 69.2 68.7 67.5 68.2
Other real estate 26.4 24.6 22.5 22.2 21.9 23.1 25.3 26.6 23.3
Private business 13.1 11.9 12.7 15.3 13.7 13.9 12.4 12.7 13.0
Valuables 78.3 86.1 88.3 88.7 87.4 89.2 85.6 84.1 83.9
Vehicles 78.1 79.6 80.8 83.0 82.3 82.6 83.3 80.8 79.2
Debt4 25.7 24.1 22.1 24.6 26.1 27.8 27.7 26.1 23.0
Safe financial assets 5 86.7 86.0 86.3 86.5 89.6 89.4 91.8 92.9 93.2
Liquid risky financial assets 6 19.2 22.1 21.4 18.2 17.2 15.7 16.4 14.7 14.4
Risky financial assets7 24.4 28.2 26.4 23.5 22.7 22.1 28.0 24.9 24.8
Total risky assets (1) 8 32.0 34.7 33.9 33.7 32.0 31.0 35.4 33.0 33.5
Total risky assets (2) 9 45.6 46.1 44.1 43.9 42.7 41.9 46.7 45.0 44.0
1 Include BOT and zero coupon bonds.
2 Include CCT, BTP, BTPI and other government bonds.
3 Include foreign assets, loans to cooperative and other financial assets as options, futures, royalties
ecc.
4 Include debt towards banks and financial institutions, commercial debt (net) and debt towards other
households.
5 Safe assets include transaction and saving accounts, certificates of deposits, postal saving certificates,
short term safer government bonds and life insurance.
6 Risky liquid financial assets comprise long term government bonds, other bonds, listed shares, mu-
tual funds and managed accounts.
7 Risky financial assets include risky liquid assets plus non listed shares, other financial assets and
defined contribution pension plan and other financial assets.
8 Total risky assets (1) are risky financial assets plus private business.
9 Total risky assets (2) are risky financial assets plus private business and other real estate.
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increase in the saving rate, in line with the already mentioned evidences from Bottazzi
et al. (2006).
At the same time, the reforms aimed to develop the so called "third-pillar" of the
previdential system, based not on public provision but on private saving and accumula-
tion in pensions funds. A fundamental step, in this sense, was the 2005 reform (decree
law n. 252/2005) of the severance pay regime, or "trattamento di fine rapporto" . It
consists in a form of deferred remuneration, which is paid to employees when the em-
ployment contract ends for reasons like pensioning or dismissal, that takes form as a
loan from the employee to the employer. The reform provided a new scheme for the
severance pay, demanding all workers to choose before July 2007 to retain the sev-
erance pay within the firm, and maintain the pre-reform regime, or to transfer it to a
form of complementary pension. In particular, the choice was based on the "silenzio-
assenso" rule, that is, in case of no choice by the worker, the severance pay would have
been transferred by the employer to a pension fund referring to the contract type of the
employee. Moreover, investment in these long term saving instruments is stimulated by
tax advantages. The contributions to complementary pension plans deductible from the
worker personal income up to the amount of 5,164 euros per year. As can be seen in
table 1.2, in 2010 the share of participants in such funds almost doubled, above 15%. It
is surprising however that the increase is not observed in 2008, probably indicating that
many workers became aware of the change in the regime after 2008.
We find it useful to classify financial assets in terms of their degree of riskiness
and liquidity. Safe financial assets include transaction and saving accounts, certificates
of deposits, postal saving certificates, short term government bonds and life insurance,
while risky financial assets include all the other kind of financial assets. By looking at
participation rates in risky financial assets, however, we cannot observe a clear trend.
This is due to the pattern of participation in voluntary pension schemes, that, as we
highlighted before, grows significantly after 2008. Focusing on liquid risky financial
assets only, that is, long term government and corporate bonds, stocks and shares, mu-
tual funds and managed accounts, we see that there have been overall a strong decline
in the participation rate, which dropped from 22.1% in 2000 to 14.4% in 2014. It is
striking also that such a decrease is very steady over time. The years in which the drop
has been more pronounced are 2004, 2008 and 2012. For completeness, we present the
figures relative to broader classifications of risky assets, that includes not only financial
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assets but also private business and real estate. As before, however, we clearly see that
the strong increase in participation in voluntary pension schemes is the principal reason
for the increase that we observe between 2008 and 2010.
Figure 1.2: Mean net wealth composition.
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Figure 1.2 shows the composition of household mean wealth. As it is well known
from the literature, the bulk of household wealth is held in real assets. In particular, the
main residence has the largest share, followed by other real estate and private business.
Financial assets and debt have a very small share in Italian household wealth. The
results presented in figure 1.2 can be seen in more detail in table 1.3, where we present
the composition of financial and real asset in terms of their components. First of all,
we see that real assets accounted for more than the 85% of total gross wealth (except in
2000). The figures for debt are small, not only for what concerns participation, as we
noted previously, but also in terms of its magnitude, since it accounts for less than the
5% of total assets.
For what regards financial assets, transaction and savings accounts have the highest
share, ranging from 36% to 45% of financial wealth, depending of the year. The share
of other individual assets are much smaller. The highest is mutual funds, which ranges
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Table 1.3: Asset shares in household portfolios, in percent. Statistics computed using survey weights.
Year 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Total financial assets 1 14.6 16.8 14.3 10.9 11.4 10.1 10.9 10.8 12.4
Transaction and savings accounts 37.7 39.7 43.6 41.9 40.4 45.5 39.0 36.8 39.5
Certificates of deposits 2.3 1.1 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.5 1.5 2.0 1.6
Postal saving certificates 1.5 1.9 1.7 2.6 2.3 2.5 2.3 2.8 2.7
Short term government bonds 2 6.3 7.6 5.0 5.0 5.2 6.4 5.4 4.0 5.2
Long term government bonds 3 4.8 5.4 3.5 3.7 4.2 3.8 3.9 5.6 4.9
Other bonds 4.6 4.3 6.0 5.5 8.2 9.2 8.8 9.8 8.1
Mutual funds 11.7 13.3 10.5 9.6 8.2 7.9 8.2 10.0 12.0
Listed shares 5.9 8.2 5.7 6.7 6.4 3.9 4.0 2.6 2.4
Non listed shares 1.6 1.4 0.9 1.5 1.1 1.1 3.6 1.0 1.7
Managed accounts 8.5 6.1 4.6 4.4 3.3 3.0 4.4 7.0 4.5
Life insurance 10.1 5.0 11.7 11.2 12.1 10.7 8.0 7.8 6.7
Voluntary pension 3.5 4.6 4.9 5.1 6.1 3.7 9.4 8.7 9.1
Other financial assets 4 1.6 1.4 1.0 1.6 1.5 0.9 1.4 1.9 1.6
Total real assets 5 85.4 83.2 85.7 89.1 88.6 89.9 89.1 89.2 87.6
Main residence 61.0 62.6 63.8 64.7 69.1 68.2 67.8 63.4 70.3
Other real estate 21.2 19.6 17.7 18.2 15.7 17.5 17.9 22.5 17.3
Private business 11.2 10.7 10.6 10.4 9.4 8.8 9.2 9.8 7.8
Valuables 2.2 2.6 3.2 2.4 2.1 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.6
Vehicles 4.4 4.5 4.7 4.3 3.7 3.5 3.4 2.8 3.1
Debt 6 5.6 3.4 3.2 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.2 5.0 4.3
Safe financial assets 7 57.9 55.4 62.9 61.8 61.0 66.5 56.2 53.3 55.7
Liquid risky financial assets 8 37.5 39.3 31.9 31.8 31.5 28.8 32.1 33.8 29.9
Risky financial assets 9 42.1 44.6 37.1 37.6 38.4 32.9 42.4 43.6 40.0
Total risky assets (9) 10 15.7 16.4 14.4 13.4 12.7 11.3 12.9 13.5 11.8
Total risky assets (10) 11 33.8 32.8 29.5 29.6 26.7 27.0 28.8 33.5 26.9
1 Total financial assets as a percentage of total assets. Financial assets categories are expressed as a
fraction of total financial assets.
2 Include BOT and zero coupon bonds.
3 Include CCT, BTP, BTPI and other government bonds.
4 Include foreign assets, loans to cooperative and other financial assets as options, futures, royalties
ecc.
5 Total real assets as a percentage of total assets. Real assets categories are expressed as a fraction of
total financial assets.
6 Debt as a fraction of total assets. It includes debt towards banks and financial institutions, commer-
cial debt (net) and debt towards other households.
7 Safe assets as a percentage of total financial assets. Include transaction and saving accounts, certifi-
cates of deposits, postal saving certificates, short term safer government bonds and life insurance.
8 Risky liquid financial assets as a percentage of total financial assets. Comprise long term government
bonds, other bonds, listed shares, mutual funds and managed accounts.
9 Risky financial assets as a percentage of total financial assets. Include risky liquid assets plus non
listed shares, other financial assets and defined contribution pension plan and other financial assets.
10 Total risky assets (1) are risky financial assets plus private business. Expressed as a percentage of
total assets.
11 Total risky assets (2) are risky financial assets plus private business and other real estate. Expressed
as a percentage of total assets.
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between 8% and 13% of financial assets. Long term illiquid form of savings like life
insurance and pension schemes instead, account together for around 15% of financial
assets. Those shares, however, must be interpreted with caution, since the values are
in large part results of the imputation process described in the appendix. The very low
value of the share of life insurance in 2000, only 5%, seems particularly unreliable.
Looking at broader aggregate, we have a more stable picture. The share of safe assets
in total financial assets ranges between 55% and 66%. As before, however, we are
interested in considering the changes in the share of liquid risky assets, rather than total
risky financial assets. As can be seen, such share decreased over time. Figure 1.3
graphically shows the average financial portfolio composition throughout the years. In
order to interpret the figures of table 1.3 correctly, it must be kept in mind that changes in
the shares are the results of changes in asset prices and household allocation decisions,
including participation. By looking at these aggregate figures it is not possible to discern
between the two.
Figure 1.3: Average financial portfolio composition.
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1.2 The cross section of household portfolios
In the previous section, we focused on aggregate figures, and we presented their trends
during the years. However, the key feature of household level micro data is that they
allow to analyse the wide cross sectional heterogeneity in asset allocation and portfolio
choice. It is a well known fact that the wealth distribution is very skewed, and that
Figure 1.4: Net wealth distribution in selected years.
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wealth is concentrated in the hands of a few households at the top. Figure 1.4 shows
the distribution of net wealth for the 2000, 2006, 2010 and 2014 waves. For a matter
of readability, the top 5 percentiles are excluded in the chart. Table 1.4 presents the
Gini index and the share of the top 5 and 10% for income and wealth for each wave
in the sample. Such measures, however, needs to be interpreted with caution, since,
as we have already mentioned, the SHIW is not well suited to describe the top tail of
the wealth distribution. Non random non respone and under reporting are likely to be
very important at high levels of wealth, and the survey design does not account for that
by oversampling wealthy households, as it is done in comparable surveys. Hence, our
computations presented in table 1.4 are likely to underestimate the true magnitude of
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Table 1.4: Inequality measures for net wealth and income. Statistics computed using survey weights.
Net wealth Income
Year Gini index Share top 5% Share top 10 % Gini index Share top 5% Share top 10 %
1998 0.625 0.324 0.456 0.175 0.275 0.375
2000 0.612 0.332 0.461 0.167 0.266 0.362
2002 0.599 0.301 0.434 0.163 0.263 0.356
2004 0.587 0.288 0.419 0.169 0.267 0.353
2006 0.600 0.306 0.434 0.167 0.264 0.348
2008 0.599 0.306 0.432 0.164 0.264 0.353
2010 0.607 0.318 0.444 0.162 0.261 0.351
2012 0.629 0.328 0.459 0.163 0.263 0.356
2014 0.601 0.295 0.427 0.154 0.253 0.350
inequality in Italy, especially for what concerns net wealth. As can be seen, income
inequality moves much less than wealth inequality, and income is much less concen-
trated. Obviously, this is related to the fact that wealth is accumulated over time. For
what regards income, we can observe a slight decline in inequality over the years, across
all of the three measures. Especially in 2014 with respect to 2012, the decline has been
substantially. Also concerning wealth, table 1.4 shows that inequality declined with
respect to the early 2000s, with the exception of 2012. In particular, wealth concentra-
tion seems to become lower after stock market downswings, and asset price collapses in
general. Such phenomenon can clearly be explained by looking at the portfolio compo-
sition across the wealth distribution. Indeed, as can be seen in figure 1.5, many financial
instruments are owned almost only by wealthy households. The figure present owner-
ship rates for various asset categories in 2014 by percentiles of total assets. We present
the figure for the 2014 wave only for a matter of readability, but very similar figures can
be obtained from the other waves in the sample. The wide heterogeneity in household
portfolios along the wealth distribution is immediately evident. First of all, it is striking
that at the lowest percentiles of the total assets distribution, there is a significant fraction
of households that do not hold any asset at all. These households are likely to hold cash
only. Moreover, with the exception of safe assets and main residence, all the other assets
show very low participation rates in the first half of the distribution. Stock ownership
and private business ownership are strongly correlated with wealth. Ownership of other
real estates is more widespread, and reach participation rates above 75% for the top 5
percentiles. From figure 1.6 we see however that in each net wealth quartile household
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Figure 1.5: Asset participation by percentiles of total assets in 2014.
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Figure 1.6: Average portfolio composition by net wealth quartiles.
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portfolios are dominated by real assets. In particular the main residence has the largest
share at any level of wealth, though also other real estates and private business have a
significant share for the top quartile. The magnitude of debt (shown as negative in the
figure) is very low in each quartile. We have to remember however, that there are im-
portant differences within wealth quartiles, and especially in the first. Indeed, the first
net wealth quartile includes two very different kinds of households: on the one side, the
"true" poor, that is, those who do not own almost any asset at all; on the other side, there
are some households that actually may own assets for an important values, but since
they are highly indebted, their net wealth is very low. It is straightforward that such
households are very different, in terms of behaviour, needs, and reaction to shocks.
In the following of the section we want to focus on risky asset ownership in order to
understand which are the factors that influence households decision to invest in risky as-
sets or not. We will focus on liquid risky financial assets instead of total risky assets, in
order to avoid the comparability problems due to the change in complementary pension
plans regulation. We will deal more in detail with this issue in the next chapter. Table
1.5 shows the participation rate and the mean share invested in risky liquid financial
assets, conditional on participation. Risky liquid assets are defined as the sum of stocks,
mutual funds, managed accounts, corporate bonds and long term government bonds.
In line with what has been already highlighted in the literature, participation is highly
correlated with wealth and income. In the first quartile of the wealth distribution, par-
ticipants were only the 3.9% in 2000 and the 0.9% in 2014. We observe that the decline
in participation has been strong in all the quartiles: for example, participation rate in the
top net wealth quartile decreased from 47.5% in 2000 to 35% in 2014. A similar pat-
tern is observed looking at the breakdown by income quartiles, with strong declines in
participation for every quartile. For what regards the level of the conditional share, the
picture is much more homogenous, ranging between 57 and 70% across wealth quartiles
and the four waves presented in the table. As previously noted, we need to keep in mind
that the issue of measurement error may affect our estimates of the shares. From the ta-
ble it is difficult to recognize any systematic difference in the share invested conditional
on participation across the various breakdowns.
A second takeaway from the table is that the age profile of participation is hump
shaped. It is interesting to note that in 2000 and 2006 the highest participation rates are
those of people aged between 46 and 60. In 2010 and 2014, instead, participation peaks
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Table 1.5: Participation rate and mean conditional share in risky liquid financial assets invested by house-
hold characteristics, in percent. Individual characteristics refer to the household head. Statistics computed
using survey weights.
2000 2006 2010 2014
Part. Share Part. Share Part. Share Part. Share
Net wealth quartiles
I 3.9 62.4 3.8 57.5 1.3 58.1 0.9 63.0
II 13.6 65.0 9.4 54.1 9.1 59.0 6.2 57.3
III 23.3 60.8 16.6 66.2 15.9 57.6 15.7 61.6
IV 47.5 68.3 38.9 66.5 39.2 70.2 35.0 62.8
Income quartiles
I 4.0 73.0 3.2 48.7 2.0 60.8 1.3 74.9
II 12.8 61.8 8.7 59.4 8.1 61.7 5.8 67.2
III 24.3 66.8 20.1 55.3 17.0 60.7 14.1 64.7
IV 47.2 67.7 36.7 68.7 38.3 70.0 36.5 61.6
Age group
Under 30 19.3 83.8 9.5 65.6 4.7 55.7 4.4 67.9
31-45 25.1 60.0 17.0 64.4 13.0 55.0 12.0 54.5
46-60 26.8 70.0 21.5 67.8 20.0 64.2 15.7 56.5
61-75 18.9 69.0 19.0 64.5 20.2 72.2 17.7 68.3
Over 75 11.7 62.5 8.4 63.0 11.9 76.8 12.4 67.7
Geographic area
North West 32.6 72.9 25.1 63.8 21.0 69.0 20.2 64.4
North East 36.1 58.0 28.3 63.1 26.3 68.5 22.1 62.7
Center 19.5 69.5 14.1 74.7 17.0 68.4 15.6 63.4
South 6.7 68.5 4.6 61.1 3.4 50.1 3.1 43.5
Islands 7.3 50.8 5.8 44.9 7.9 66.7 6.5 61.5
Municipality size
Under 20,000 22.1 72.3 17.6 59.8 16.9 66.0 13.5 54.7
20,000-40,000 20.5 67.8 15.8 66.1 14.1 64.8 13.4 64.1
40,000-500,000 24.1 54.0 17.6 65.2 16.9 67.3 15.9 65.1
Over 500,000 19.4 76.7 16.3 73.8 15.5 76.9 15.8 75.7
Education
No education/Primary 9.7 46.5 7.2 63.3 7.5 61.6 6.6 69.8
Secondary 26.9 68.3 19.0 64.5 17.2 67.2 13.7 57.9
Tertiary 46.3 74.9 37.7 67.7 31.9 70.6 32.7 67.3
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within the 61-75 age group. Analysing the changes occurred over time, participation
rates dropped more strongly for young people, under 45 years old. In particular among
younger households, the fraction of participants was 19.3% in 2000, and it substantially
declined to 9.5% in 2006, to reach only 4.4% in 2014. A similar pattern is observed
for households whose age is between 31 and 45. Participation rate in this group more
than halved between 2000 and 2014, dropping to 12% from 25.1% in 2000. In table
Figure 1.7: Fraction of stock market participants by age and cohort, in percent.
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1.5 we present participation rates in terms of age and time. Given the well known prob-
lem of collinearity between age, time and cohort, using repeated cross sections we can
identify only two of these effects at the time. In depth explanation of this issue and of
the possibilities available to deal with it can be found in Ameriks and Zeldes (2004).
In practice, there are two feasible alternatives: the first is to describe the data in terms
of cohort and age effects, disregarding time effects, the second is to explain the data
combining age and unrestricted time effects. Portfolio theory suggests that time effects
are important, given that sample moments are used as proxies for the moments of the
distribution of asset returns. Also age effects are predicted to be important: younger
investors, with a longer investment horizon, should invest more in risky assets than
older investors. Instead there are not very strong reasons for including cohorts effects.
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However, cohorts effects may matter if early life conditions are important in order to de-
termine how households evaluate investment opportunities. For example, Malmendier
and Nagel (2011) find a significant effect of the stock market performance experienced
during the lifetime on ownership probabilities. Using data on household portfolios from
the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances, they find that individuals who experienced low
stock market returns are less willingness to invest in risky assets and their self reported
risk aversion is higher. Work by Ampudia and Ehrmann (2017b) extend their analysis
to many Euro area countries, using data from the Eurosystem Household Finance and
Consumption Survey. They find also evidences that households weight more recent than
past events, and that the memory of stock market crashes is more persistent than the one
of booms. In figure 1.7 we aggregated households into five years of birth cohorts, based
on the birth data of the reference person. The broken lines connect the raw data for each
cohort, while the blue line is the estimated age profile of risky asset ownership. We
Figure 1.8: Estimated age profiles for risky asset ownership using different SHIW waves.
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restrict the sample to include only individuals aged between 25 and 80; cohort one (the
youngest) thus includes household whose head was born between 1986 and 1990 and
is considered only for the 2012 and 2014 waves, while the oldest cohort refers to indi-
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viduals born between 1926 and 1930. Figure 1.7 shows also the estimated age profile
of risky asset ownership. The estimation comes from a logit regression of the binary
ownership variable on an age polynomial and unrestricted time effects. Equity owner-
ship is clearly hump shaped over the life cycle, however, the drop in participation rates
has been stronger for younger households than for the older ones. In figure 1.8 we esti-
mate the age profile using only a wave at the time (clearly, time effects are not included
and the independent variable in the regression is age only, in a polynomial form). The
drop in estimated participation rates for the young is very pronounced. Interestingly,
the curves moved towards the right: while participation peaks between ages 50 and 55
in 2000, in 2014 it peaks around 65 years old. Hence, the drop in participation rates
is mainly due to the lack of participation of young households. At the same time, es-
pecially in 2014 we observe a strong decline in the probability of participating also for
what regards households whose head is aged between 45 and 60.
Figure 1.9: Participation rates in risky assets by year, net wealth quartile and education attainment of the
reference person, in percent.
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The last evidence from table 1.5 is the positive relationship existing between educa-
tion and investment in risky assets. Indeed, more educated households are more likely
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to own risky assets at every level of wealth, as can be seen in figure 1.9. To explain such
correlation, previous work in the literature focused on financial literacy, or the capacity
of households to understand and correctly evaluate the investment opportunities avail-
able. We will review this literature in the next chapter. Figure 1.9 shows that the decline
in participation has been particularly strong among poor and low educated households.
In the first quartile of net wealth, the participation rates for low educated households are
almost zero in 2014. Interestingly, it seems that investors with a different educational
background react differently to changing macroeconomic conditions. For example, let
us focus on the change in participation between 2010 and 2014: participation of high
educated households increased, while in the rest of the population the fraction of house-
holds holding risky assets decreased. At first, it may be argued that, given the positive
relationship between education and wealth, it is possible that the decline in wealth made
a limited resource constraint binding for lower educated (and thus poorer) households.
However, figure 1.9 show that this is not (at least entirely) the case: indeed, we see that
this divergent pattern across education classes is present even for households within the
top wealth quartile.
1.3 An international comparison
In this section we want to provide a brief overview on household portfolios in different
European countries and in the United States. We exploit two different datasets: for what
concerns Europe, data are from the Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption
Survey (HFCS), an harmonised survey coordinated by the European Central Bank, for
the U.S., instead, data come from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) run by the
Federal Reserve Board of Governors.
In the following, we choose to focus on eight Euro Area countries: Austria, Belgium,
Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands. Table 1.6 presents the
participation rates by asset categories for each country, while table 1.7 shows the shares
of each asset in household portfolios. With respect to the tables for the SHIW only,
here asset definitions are broader, in order to have harmonised data for each country.
It is immediately evident that there are important cross country differences, both in the
participation rates and in composition of the portfolio. Christelis et al. (2013) find that
such differences largely depend on the economic environment, rather then on differences
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Table 1.6: Participation rates by country, in percent. Statistics computed using survey weights.
AT BE DE ES FR IE IT NL U.S. EA
Financial assets
Transaction and savings accounts 1 99.7 97.5 99.0 99.6 99.6 93.9 93.2 98.6 92.4 96.9
Bonds 2 4.0 7.8 4.2 2.1 1.2 4.5 13.0 3.8 1.4 4.6
Mutual funds 10.0 21.0 13.1 5.7 8.5 3.3 5.9 13.3 8.2 9.4
Listed shares 5.4 11.0 9.6 11.0 11.7 13.1 3.7 8.0 13.8 8.7
Non listed shares 0.4 1.0 0.6 2.1 1.9 0.6 0.8 0.1 1.3 1.3
Managed accounts 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.9 0.8 5.2 0.3
Life insurance/Voluntary pension 19.7 47.6 51.8 26.5 40.4 23.3 17.1 35.3 56.5 34.3
Other financial assets 3 9.1 8.1 25.0 11.7 12.7 5.9 2.1 11.5 7.7 13.1
Real assets
Main residence 47.7 70.3 44.3 83.1 58.7 70.5 68.2 57.5 65.2 61.2
Other real estate 12.1 18.5 20.2 40.3 23.3 23.0 23.1 8.1 13.3 24.1
Private business 7.0 8.5 9.3 14.3 8.5 20.2 16.0 2.7 9.6 10.9
Valuables 16.2 12.6 15.1 22.6 100.0 61.0 83.9 11.5 6.6 44.5
Vehicles 76.6 76.2 73.0 78.4 80.0 82.5 79.2 85.9 86.3 76.7
Debt 4 34.4 48.4 45.1 49.3 47.1 56.8 21.2 63.1 74.5 42.4
Safe financial assets 5 99.7 97.5 99.0 99.6 99.6 93.9 93.2 98.6 92.4 96.9
Liquid risky financial assets 6 15.2 29.2 19.1 15.2 17.9 17.7 17.9 18.7 18.8 17.5
Risky financial assets 7 35.3 62.8 66.6 42.1 51.0 36.6 31.0 49.2 62.6 48.0
Total risky assets (1) 8 38.8 64.0 67.7 46.9 53.6 43.2 38.6 50.0 64.5 51.7
Total risky assets (2) 9 43.6 67.5 71.8 63.2 59.3 48.8 47.6 52.9 65.9 59.8
Country codes: AT Austria, BE Belgium, DE Germany, ES Spain, FR France, IE Ireland, IT Italy, NL
Netherlands, U.S. United States, EA Euro area. Euro area includes all 19 eurozone countries except
Lithuania.
1 Include certificates of deposit.
2 Include government and corporate bonds.
3 Include foreign assets, loans to cooperative and other financial assets as options, futures, royalties ecc.
4 Include mortgages, unsecured credit lines and credit card debt.
5 Safe assets include transaction and saving accounts.
6 Risky liquid financial assets comprise bonds, listed shares, mutual funds and managed accounts.
7 Risky financial assets include risky liquid assets plus non listed shares, other financial assets, defined
contribution pension plan and life insurance.
8 Total risky assets (1) are risky financial assets plus private business.
9 Total risky assets (2) are risky financial assets plus private business and other real estate.
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in individual household characteristics in different countries. On the other side, Guiso
et al. (2008) find that a cultural factor such as trust is an important determinant of risk
taking in household portfolios. It is clear that both explanations hold: a huge literature
analyze the interactions between culture and institutions and it is likely that the two are
related each other, and together drive the outcomes observed in the data. From table
1.6 we first of all see that in Italy, Ireland and in the U.S. there is a sizable fraction
of "unbanked" households. Ampudia and Ehrmann (2017a) report that the fraction of
such households excluded from the financial system was 3% in the Euro Area as a
whole, using data from the first wave of the HFCS. They find that these households are
mainly low income, unemployed and poor educated, and that there exists a substantial
gap in net wealth between these families and their "banked" counterpart: they estimate
it to be around 70 thousands euros in the Euro Area and 45 thousands dollars in the
United States. They also find that such households are much less likely to own their
residence and to be indebted. Transaction and saving accounts’ share in total financial
assets ranges from 36.2% in France to 45% in Italy, with two big exceptions: Austria,
in which they make up to more than the 60% of financial assets, and the United States,
in which, instead, they represent only 14.7% of financial wealth.
Bonds are much more widespread in Italy (13.0%) and in Belgium (7.8%) than in
the other countries. In particular in France and in the US, the fraction of households
that own bonds is lower than 1.5%. However, it must be noted that in the SCF 10%
of households declare to own saving bonds and 7.8% own certificates of deposits (these
categories are not reported in the tables and included in transaction and saving accounts).
By looking at the shares is even more clear that investing in bonds is a peculiarity of
Italian households only: bonds represent 19.2% of financial assets, while in all the other
countries this share does not exceed 3.5%. For what regards stock market participa-
tion, direct holdings of listed stocks are much more common in the US (13.8%) than in
Europe (Euro area average: 8.8%) where, however, we register substantial cross coun-
try heterogeneity: direct stock market participation rates range from 3.7% in Italy, to
participation rates around and above 10% in Germany (9.6%), Belgium (11%), Spain
(11%) and Ireland (13.1%). Direct stock holdings have a share of 14.6% of financial
wealth in the US, while in none of the eight European countries considered this share
exceed the 10%. It is important to notice that the participation rate in Italy is compa-
rable with the one registered for Estonia (3.6%) and Poland (3.5%) and it is among the
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lowest in Europe, if we exclude Greece and Latvia that have participation rates lower
than 1%. On the other side, indirect equity investment through mutual funds is more
common in Europe than in the US, especially in Belgium (21%), Germany (13.1%) and
the Netherlands (13.3%). In the US the participation rate is around the 8%, while in
Italy we register a participation rate of 5.9%, again, well below the Euro area average of
9.4%. Regarding other managed assets, the striking difference between the US (5.2%)
and the Euro area countries, all below 1%, casts doubts about the comparability of such
category between the two surveys.
The picture we have given so far, however, it is incomplete without considering eq-
uity holdings through retirement accounts. Indeed, here we observe the largest cross
country differences, likely reflecting substantial differences in social security infras-
tructures. The largest participation rates are observed for the US and Germany (56.5%
and 51.8%, respectively), followed by Belgium and France (47.6 and 40.4%) and the
Netherlands (35.3%). Also for what regards the share of this retirement savings on total
financial assets the cross country differences are very strong, with a share as high as
40.3% in France, higher than 30% in Germany, Ireland, Netherlands and United States,
and a share between 16.6% and 20.4% in Austria, Belgium and Spain, with Italy at
13.2%. Italy has also the lowest participation rate in our sample, around 17%, and we
have already mentioned how the development of occupational pension plans has been
very recent. Such saving instrument, indeed, was practically not existent before the
2005 reform, which took effects in 2007. Finally, we register substantial heterogeneity
also in other financial assets. Regarding the HFCS, such item is made by money owed
to households and other financial assets, such as derivatives, futures, royalties etc. The
high rates registered for Germany and Spain are mostly due to the former, that is, money
owed to households. It is likely that such assets are loans made by the households to
a cooperative (typically composed by other households that are also lenders) in order
to build residential real estate. This mechanism is in some countries a common way to
acquire home ownership. This may only partly explains those figures, as in Germany,
France and the US we also registered high participation rates for other financial assets
that, given the lack of further information, we cannot explore deeper. It is reassuring,
however, by looking at table 1.7 that this category does not represent more than 6-7%
of financial assets in none of the countries.
In terms of composition of the whole portfolio, financial assets represents a much
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Table 1.7: Asset shares in household portfolios by country, in percent. Statistics computed using survey
weights.
AT BE DE ES FR IE IT NL U.S. EA
Total financial assets 1 15.0 24.7 24.0 15.1 19.1 15.1 12.1 24.9 44.6 18.6
Transaction and savings accounts 2 61.2 38.8 43.1 40.6 36.2 44.1 45.0 39.6 14.7 42.1
Bonds 3 3.3 3.4 3.1 1.7 1.2 2.1 19.2 7.7 3.1 4.4
Mutual funds 10.6 23.2 8.9 5.6 4.3 4.9 12.3 7.5 13.9 8.6
Listed shares 3.2 6.6 6.3 9.1 9.2 8.3 2.6 2.5 14.6 6.8
Non listed shares 2.1 2.2 2.6 16.5 4.4 0.5 1.8 0.2 5.5 4.5
Managed accounts 0.2 0.9 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.3 4.6 0.2 7.2 0.7
Life insurance/Voluntary pension 16.6 20.4 30.9 18.7 40.3 36.7 13.2 36.5 39.5 28.2
Other financial assets 4 2.8 4.3 5.1 6.8 4.5 2.1 1.3 5.9 1.6 4.7
Total real assets 5 85.0 75.3 76.0 84.9 80.9 84.9 87.9 75.1 55.4 81.4
Main residence 58.0 67.0 55.1 58.5 56.2 53.3 70.2 80.1 51.5 60.3
Other real estate 16.9 19.3 24.4 28.5 20.2 35.8 17.4 12.6 12.6 22.3
Private business 20.3 9.8 15.1 9.2 14.3 6.1 7.8 1.6 28.6 11.7
Valuables 1.3 0.9 1.5 1.0 6.0 2.0 1.6 0.8 1.4 2.3
Vehicles 3.5 2.9 3.8 2.8 3.4 2.9 3.1 4.9 5.9 3.5
Debt 6 6.2 10.5 10.5 11.3 12.0 24.0 4.2 35.2 15.2 11.3
Safe financial assets 7 61.2 38.8 43.1 40.6 36.2 44.1 45.0 39.6 14.7 42.1
Liquid risky financial assets 8 17.0 33.2 18.2 16.4 14.6 15.3 34.1 17.6 31.5 19.8
Risky financial assets 9 38.8 61.2 56.9 59.4 63.8 55.9 55.0 60.4 85.3 57.9
Total risky assets (1) 10 23.1 22.5 25.2 16.8 23.8 13.6 13.5 16.2 53.9 20.3
Total risky assets (2) 11 37.4 37.0 43.7 41.0 40.1 44.0 28.8 25.7 60.9 38.4
Country codes: AT Austria, BE Belgium, DE Germany, ES Spain, FR France, IE Ireland, IT Italy, NL
Netherlands, U.S. United States, EA Euro area. Euro area includes all 19 eurozone countries except
Lithuania.
1 Total financial assets as a percentage of total assets. Financial assets categories are expressed as a
fraction of total financial assets.
2 Include certificates of deposit.
3 Include government and corporate bonds.
4 Include foreign assets, loans to cooperative and other financial assets as options, futures, royalties ecc.
5 Total real assets as a percentage of total assets. Real assets categories are expressed as a fraction of
total financial assets.
6 Debt as a fraction of total assets. It includes mortgages, unsecured credit lines and credit card debt.
7 Safe assets as a percentage of total financial assets. transaction and saving accounts.
8 Risky liquid financial assets as a percentage of total financial assets. Comprise bonds, listed shares,
mutual funds and managed accounts.
9 Risky financial assets as a percentage of total financial assets. Include risky liquid assets plus non
listed shares, other financial assets, defined contribution pension plan and life insurance.
10 Total risky assets (1) are risky financial assets plus private business. Expressed as a percentage of total
assets.
11 Total risky assets (2) are risky financial assets plus private business and other real estate. Expressed
as a percentage of total assets.
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higher share of total assets in the United States than in Europe. Only 55% percent of
US households wealth is in real assets, while for the whole Euro Area this share is as
high as 81.4%. However, the fraction of households owning their main residence in
the US are 65.2%, against a Euro area average of 61.2%. Still, large differences are
present across the Eurozone, especially in Austria and Germany it is very low, below
50%, while in Spain 83,1% of households own their house. Such heterogeneity may
be seen graphically in figure 1.10, which shows the home ownership rates for all the
country in the sample. Figure 1.10 splits also indebted from outright homeowners. We
notice that in the U.S. and in the Netherlands the vast majority of homeowners has a
mortgage. Having a mortgage is common also in Belgium and Spain and, to a lesser
extent, in France and Germany. In Italy, as we have previously shown, only a small
fraction of homeowners have a mortgage. In an influential paper, Mian et al. (2013)
show that there is a strong connection between housing net worth and consumption,
and that such connection is stronger for indebted households5. Since then, the role of
homeownership, household debt and house prices in driving consumption slumps and
economic recessions has drawn a lot of attention. Research on the topic focused mainly
in the U.S., mainly due to data availability reasons. Although a review of this vast
literature is beyond the scope of the present work, such wide differences in household
homeownership rates and indebtedness seem to point out that the levered losses story
may not be sufficient to explain the magnitude of the Great Recession in many European
countries.
Another key aspect of cross country differences in household portfolios is private
businesses, both at the extensive and at the intensive margin. As regards participation,
the highest rates are registered in Ireland (20.2%), Italy (16%) and Spain(14.3%). Then
we find Austria, Belgium, Germany, France ad the Unites States, in which the partici-
pation rate ranges from 7% in Austria to 9.6% in the U.S. In the Netherlands, instead,
the participation rate is very low, only 2.7%. Concerning, instead, the share of private
business in real assets, in the United States it is much higher than in Europe, 28.6% with
respect to a Euro area average of 11.7%. Comparing participation rates and the shares,
it seems that on average, such businesses have a higher value in the U.S., in Austria,
5Mian et al. (2013) is just a part of the extensive narrative of the Great Recession by these authors,
that they sum up in Mian and Sufi (2014). They highlight the role of "levered losses" suffered by indebted
homeowners following the collapse in house prices as one of the main driver of the strong and prolonged
reduction in consumption during the Great Recession.
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Figure 1.10: Homeownership rate by country, in percent.
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Germany and France, rather than in Italy, Spain and Ireland, the three countries with the
highest participation rates. Obviously, looking only at the share of private business in
total real assets may be misleading: indeed, in these latter three countries households
accumulate much more real wealth in houses and real wealth than in the others, thus
lowering the share. Another argument that imposes attention in evaluating these num-
bers is related to the different degree of oversampling that takes place in the surveys. A
largely documented fact, indeed, is that private business wealth is concentrated at the
top of the wealth distribution6. Since the ability to cover the top tail of the wealth dis-
tribution varies across surveys, as we have already mentioned, we have the concern that
such shares are not truly comparable.
Finally, we observe a wide heterogeneity in the fraction of indebted households in
different countries. On this aspect, the difference between Europe and the Unites States
is very strong: considering Euro area as a whole, the participation rate 42.4% while in
6This is a well known fact that we have shown for Italy in the previous section. There is large evidence
that it is a common feature of household portfolios also in other countries (see (Eurosystem Household
Finance and Consumption Network, 2016b) for evidence on Euro area).
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the US 74.5% of households have some kind of debt. Regarding the eight Euro area
countries we are considering, we notice that Belgium, Germany, Spain and France are
very similar, both in terms of participation (ranging between 45% and 50%) and in terms
of the share of debt on total assets, which ranges between 10 and 12%. Further, being
indebted is less common in Austria (34.4%) and much more common in Ireland, where
56.8% of the households have some kind of financial liabilities. At the two extremes
we find Italy, where only 21.2% recur to debt, and the Netherlands, where instead the
participation rate is as high as 63.1%.
Finally, we present the figures for some aggregated categories. We divide financial
assets into safe and risky, and then we separately consider financial risky assets, total
risky assets including private business and an alternative definition that includes also real
estates other than the main residence7. From the discussion above regarding savings for
retirement and the role that voluntary pension plans play in some countries, it seems
clear that in this international comparison would not be useful to focus on risky liquid
assets only. Household financial portfolios are typically safer in Europe than in the US,
especially if we look at the share invested in risky assets: in the US, such share equals
the 85.3% of financial assets, while in Europe the average share is 57.9%. However, it is
misleading to consider our definition of risky financial assets as equity. First it includes
bonds, even though the share of directly held bonds in portfolios is very low, on average.
But, more importantly, it considers the whole value of mutual funds and retirement
accounts. Obviously, a large part of these items may be invested in safe assets. Imputing
the share invested in equity in these accounts is not straightforward, given that such
information is not available in the HFCS and in the SCF. Hence, we prefer to avoid
an imputation exercise of this kind, which would have to rely on assumptions that are
somewhat arbitrary8. Figure 1.11 shows net wealth composition by country, and allows
7The results of these tables are different from the results for the SHIW presented in the first section.
This is due to the fact that in the HFCS some categories are defined broader, especially for what concerns
financial assets: for example, we cannot distinguish short and long term bonds, or corporate and govern-
ment. Moreover, we cannot distinguish amounts invested in voluntary pension plans from cash value of
life insurance policies.
8Campbell (2016) exploits alternative sources, and estimates a share of mutual funds and retirement
accounts invested in bonds and stocks equal to 0.85 for the US. He further assumes that such share
equals one in Europe (in the absence of reliable information) and estimates a share invested in equity
of 0.49 in Germany, 0.64 in the Netherlands, 0.34 in Spain, 0.51 in France for mutual funds and 0.213
(Germany), 0.372 (Netherlands), 0.266 (Spain) and 0.278 (France) for retirement accounts. Given the
lack of alternative sources, he assumes the share for Italy equal to 0.5.
42
1.3. An international comparison
Figure 1.11: Net wealth composition by country, in percent.
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us to sum up the facts highlighted up to now. In particular, we see that even if in the US
debt is much more diffused, on average the amount of debt is much lower. This is due to
the fact that while in Europe debt typically takes the form of mortgage to purchase real
estate, in the US debt in the form of credit card debt or unsecured credit lines to finance
consumption is more widespread. The figure highlights also the striking difference in
the weight of financial and real assets in Europe and in the United States, where financial
assets represent almost 45% percent of total assets.
The wide heterogeneity in household attitudes towards risky investment is main-
tained also when we look at the participation rates by total assets deciles, as in figure
1.12. Some features of the chart are worth to be mentioned. First, we see that at the
top of the gross wealth distribution, in the US almost every household holds some kind
of risky assets, while in European countries as Italy, Austria, Ireland and Spain the par-
ticipation rate does not exceed 70% even at such levels of wealth. Second, we se that
in some countries (i.e. Netherlands, Austria and, to a lesser extent, Germany) the par-
ticipation rates increases in the first deciles, then decreases and rises again at the top
of the distribution. One explanation for this pattern is related to home ownership. In-
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deed, since we consider here the distribution of total wealth, it is clear that in the bottom
deciles the majority of households do not own their main residence, while homeowners
are concentrated in the right part of the distribution. Thus, the peak in the participation
rate most likely corresponds to the decile in which we find those households that we
may call "rich renters". This households are relatively very rich, considered that they
do not own the house i which they live. This explanation seems consistent with the fact
that such peculiar pattern is observed at higher deciles in the countries where the home
ownership rate (figure 1.10) are the lowest. Indeed, the rich renter category is much less
numerous in countries as Spain or Italy. Though this pattern seems common to almost
of the countries, its magnitude varies a lot. In particular in the Netherlands it is very
strong, with the participation rate in the third decile that is more or less the same of the
one in the tenth decile.
Figure 1.12: Participation rates in risky asset by country and deciles of total assets.
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Figure 1.13 shows the share of risky assets in household financial portfolio by
deciles of total assets. The top panel shows the unconditional share, while in the bottom
panel we consider only households that own risky assets. For the reasons mentioned
above, such shares do not provide a true measure of the riskiness of the portfolio, given
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Figure 1.13: Unconditional share (top) and conditional share (bottom) invested in risky asset by country
and deciles of total assets.
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that we considered as risky assets also all kinds of bonds, and mutual funds and retire-
ment accounts as a whole. Hence, they provide an upper bound. Figure 1.13, however,
shows at least two important evidences. First, coherently with what observed in the lit-
erature9, portfolios of the rich are much riskier on average than portfolios of the rest of
the population. Second, once we consider only households that own risky assets, a large
part of the heterogeneity disappears, and the relationship between the share and wealth
becomes flat. This is a strong argument in favor of using a constant relative risk aver-
sion function to describe household preferences, rather then ones in which relative risk
aversion is declining. As we will make clearer in the next chapter, a strong implication
of CRRA utility functions is that the share invested in the risky asset does not depend
on wealth. At the same time, however, if risk aversion does not decline with wealth, we
need to resort to alternative factors able to explain why the correlation between wealth
and participation is so high. This will be precisely the objective of the next chapter, in
which we present the theory of household portfolios, and we analyse the extent to which
various explanation that have been put forward in the literature match the evidences of
our descriptive analysis.
9See Carroll (2002), Bach et al. (2015), Campbell (2016), among many others.
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choice
The lack of participation to the financial markets poses significant challenges to the stan-
dard theory of portfolio choice. To begin with, we introduce a very simple framework
to describe household portfolio choice. In particular, we will show that in the simplest
version, given a positive equity premium, a standard portfolio choice model are not
able to explain why so few households participate in the stock market. The literature
has referred to this as the "stock market participation puzzle", or "stockholding puzzle"
(Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995), and has developed a number of different explanations
able to account, at least in part, for such puzzle. Let us a consider a single period port-
folio choice model. Households are endowed with an amount of wealth W that allocate
into two assets: one is risky, and pays a random gross return r˜ while the other one is
risk free, with a (certain) return rf . Households maximize their expected utility from
wealth, and have a standard utility function U(W ), that is, the utility function is mono-
tonically increasing in W , so that U ′(W ) > 0 and moreover the investor is risk averse,
thus U ′′(W ) < 0. The investor then has to choose the fraction α∗ to invest in the risky
asset that maximizes her expected wealth. Conversely, the fraction invested in the risk
free asset is given by 1− α∗. Note that short sales are not allowed.
Formally, we can describe the problem above in the following way:
max
α
EU [W (rf + α(r˜ − rf ))]. (2.1)
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Deriving equation (2.1) we obtain the following first order condition:
EU ′[W (rf + α(r˜ − rf ))]W (r˜ − rf ) = 0. (2.2)
From (2.2) is clear why non participation in the risky asset is a puzzle: substituting
α = 0 we obtain
EU ′[W (rf )]W (r˜ − rf ) = U ′[W (rf )]E(r˜ − rf )W = 0. (2.3)
Thus, with an expected positive equity premium equation (2.3) is always positive, since
U ′(Wrf ) > 0, and hence with α = 0 optimality is violated. Such a conclusion is a
strong implication of the basic asset allocation model: every investor should invest a
positive fraction of her wealth in the risky asset, independently from her degree of risk
aversion.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section one introduces participation
costs, and show how they affect participation. Section two combine participation costs
and trust, and we present the results of a portfolio choice model in which both factors
are considered. Finally, section three is devoted to analyze further elements that the
literature has related to portfolio choice, specifically risk aversion and background risk,
financial literacy and expectations.
2.1 Introducing participation costs
A first extension of the framework that, at least in part, can explain the puzzle is the
introduction of a fixed participation cost. In particular, such feature explains one of the
well documented features of the data, the correlation between stock market participation
and wealth that we have documented in the previous chapter. This section closely fol-
lows Vissing-Jørgensen (2004). In her seminal contribution, she introduced two types
of participation costs: a one-time entry and a per-period participation cost. Such costs
have a monetary component, that we can think of as the commission fee that has to be
paid to the financial intermediaries, and a non monetary cost, assimilable to the time and
efforts that the investor must spend in researching the information necessary to make the
investment. It is clear that both of these components can be heterogenous, and more-
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over, correlated each other: in a market with frictions, lower educated investors may
have to devote more efforts to acquire information about the investment opportunities
available, and, at the same time, they are more likely to end up making less attractive
investments.
We abstain from inter temporal considerations and we limit ourselves to consider
only the presence of a per period participation cost. We assume that in order to invest in
the risky asset and to benefit from the positive equity premium, households must pay a
fixed cost f , and thus their decision weights the benefits from participation against this
cost. First of all, let us see how the presence of a fixed (per-period) participation cost
changes the problem in equation (2.1). Similarly, households choose α to maximize
the expected utility from their wealth, that, however, in the case of positive α becomes
W − f . Thus, we can define α∗ as the optimal share invested in the risky asset that
solves the following optimization problem:
max
α
EU [(W − f)(rf + α(r˜ − rf ))]. (2.4)
Deriving with respect to α we obtain the same first order condition as in (2.2), only
with W replaced by W − f . Clearly, the conclusion is the same, the α∗ that solves
the optimization problem must be strictly positive. However, given α∗, the investor
participates in the stock market if her expected utility from the investment is higher than
the (certain) utility coming from investing only in the risk-free asset, thus avoiding to
pay the fixed cost. Formally, we can summarize it in the following condition:
EU [(W − f)(rf + α∗(r˜ − rf ))] ≥ U(Wrf ). (2.5)
We can replace the left hand side of (2.5) with its certain equivalent to obtain
EU [(W − f)(rf + α∗(r˜ − rf ))] = U [(W − f)(rf + α∗(rce − rf )) ≥ U(Wrf ), (2.6)
from which we can express the participation condition as
(W − f)(α∗(rce − rf )) ≥ frf . (2.7)
We can then interpret the two sides of equation (2.7) as the benefits and the costs from
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participation, respectively. The left hand side represents the net benefit from investing
α∗(W − f) in the risky asset, proportional to the risk-adjusted equity premium, while
the left hand side represents the cost avoidable by not investing in the risky asset, times
the return rf that can be achieved investing the amount f in the risk-free assets. From
equation (2.7) it is clear that the value of the fixed cost defines a wealth threshold below
which the expected utility maximizing investor is better off staying out from the stock
market and investing all of her wealth in the safe asset. Rearranging equation (2.7) we
can express such wealth threshold as
W = f
(
1 +
rf
α∗(rce − rf )
)
. (2.8)
As can be seen from equation (2.8), the framework above implies that the relationship
between the wealth threshold that triggers participation and the fixed cost is linear; the
slope depends on the ratio between the return on the risk free asset and the risk-adjusted
excess return obtainable investing a fraction α∗ in the risky asset, where α∗ is the optimal
share invested in case of participation. Given a fixed cost f , the lower α∗ or the risk
adjusted equity premium, the higher the threshold.
We can now replicate the exercise made by Vissing-Jørgensen (2004) in order to
obtain an estimate of these costs from the data. The intuition is quite simple: since we
assume that cost is fixed for everyone and we observe a participation rate of x% in the
risky asset, given the risk-adjusted equity premium and the optimal share invested con-
ditional on participation, we can compute the value of the benefit as a function of wealth,
and then estimate the level of the cost necessary in order to explain a participation rate
of x%. We need three assumption in order to make this computation. First of all, we
assume that each nonparticipant would invest an optimal share α∗ equal to the average
share invested by participants. We consider as risky the amounts invested directly in
stocks, in mutual funds or in managed accounts. Then, we compute the share invested
in the risky asset as the fraction of liquid financial wealth (i.e. financial wealth exclud-
ing the cash value of life insurance policies and voluntary pension plans, as defined in
table 1.2) held into these three financial instruments. From the one side, this approach
clearly overstates both the participation rates and the risky share in the portfolio, as a
significant part of mutual funds and managed accounts holdings may not be invested
in stocks. At the same time, however, it entails also understating the total amount of
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stocks in household portfolios, by ignoring holdings through pension funds. However,
there are various reasons that lead us to prefer this approach. First of all, the quality of
the data on pension funds and their composition is lower than the rest of the portfolio
data in the survey, and many values are imputed (see the appendix); in particular data
on pension funds are very scarce in the waves before 2006. Second, even assuming that
our imputation is reliable, it would be difficult to estimate which share of the fund is
invested in stocks. Third, as we have seen in chapter 1, investing in mutual funds entails
a monetary benefit rather than a cost, thanks to the tax advantage, though it may involve
some non-monetary costs. Fourth, and last, following the 2005 reform, the majority of
investments in these instruments are related to specific agreements between employer
and employee, and many households in the survey show very little knowledge of the ex-
act characteristics of the investment. This last point is supported also by evidences from
the SHIW. In 2008, respondents have been asked four questions relative to the charac-
teristics of occupational pension plans. The questions asked about the tax advantage, the
possibility to withdraw part of the capital, the riskiness of the investment and the way in
which the pension is calculated. It is striking that only 3% of the households answered
correctly to all the four questions, while more than the 40% answered wrongly to all the
questions. A final consideration that leads us to exclude those amounts is the fact that
the transfer of the severance pay to a private fund generates differences in wealth across
households that may not be true. Indeed, severance pay is very difficult to be estimated
and it is not measured in the survey. So, such value is not present in the dataset for peo-
ple who retained it within the firm, while we have it for those who transferred it to the
new regime. Imagine two households with identical wealth and the same accumulated
severance pay. One transferred it to a private fund, while the other chose to retain it
within the firm. Including the value of the pension plans the former would appear richer
and the latter poorer, even though such difference does not exist, in practice. For these
reasons, we prefer to exclude such amounts from the following analysis.
The second assumption regards the equity premium: following, again, Vissing-
Jørgensen (2004) we set the risk-adjusted equity premium at 0.04, which is a quite
conservative value, considered that the historical excess return in the United States
is estimated between 6% and 7%. A third assumption is to compute the benefits as
(W )(α∗(rce− rf )) rather than (W − f)(α∗(rce− rf )). Also this third assumption over-
states the benefits from participation. Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of the stock
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Figure 2.1: Stock market participation benefits for nonparticipants.
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market participation benefit computed as described above using data of three different
SHIW waves. Given that in each wave we have assumed that the risk-adjusted equity
premium and the optimal share invested if participation occurs are the same across the
sample, the value of the benefit is linear in financial wealth. For a matter of readability,
percentiles above the 95th are not included in figure 2.1. Table 2.1 shows the level of
fixed costs needed to explain the decision of 50, 75, 90 and 100% of non participants
households in each wave. From table 2.1 it is evident that even a low participation cost
is able to account for the decision to not participate of a large share of the sample. For
example, a cost of only 92.9 euros explains the decision of half of the non participants
in 2014. Clearly, this is related to wealth: from equation 2.7, indeed, we notice that
the benefits from participation are directly proportional to wealth. Thus, the low levels
of costs able to explain the decision of a significant part of non participants households
reflect the low median financial wealth, as can be seen in table 2.1. Hence, the presence
of a fixed participation cost can plausibly explain the relationship between wealth and
stock market participation well documented in the data, at least at relatively low values
of wealth.
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Table 2.1: Fixed costs needed to explain the decision of x% of nonparticipants.
Year 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Fraction
50% 1 95.3 115.9 122.8 129.0 122.5 86.9 92.0 79.6 92.9
75% 1 317.6 309.1 294.7 335.4 324.2 253.6 312.9 262.6 284.9
90% 1 817.9 772.7 663.2 773.9 780.9 608.4 699.5 795.7 759.8
100% 1 44,864.5 111,891.3 55,263.5 59,333.2 54,687.2 35,668.8 54,915.2 82,648.3 47,541.6
Matching participation rate 2 952.9 865.5 736.8 902.9 1,026.4 909.3 1,029.7 1,452.1 1,234.6
Share fixed to 0.45 3 774.1 693.1 682.6 758.9 958.0 1035.1 1082.1 1333.2 1170.0
Summary statistics
Participation rate 13.5 16.8 16.4 12.8 11.3 9.9 9.1 7.1 8.3
Average share 4 55.4 56.2 48.6 53.5 48.2 39.5 42.8 49.0 47.5
Liquid financial wealth
Mean 29,827.1 36,214.2 29,018.6 26,197.5 29,314.14 26,615.6 29,478.3 28,708.9 28,392.6
Median 7,167.8 6,876.0 8,216.9 8,432.6 7,992.6 6,713.4 7,306.2 5,598.3 6,000.0
1 Values in euros, 2014 = 1.
2 Fixed costs that generate a participation rate equal to the one observed in the data.
3 Fixed costs that generate a participation rate equal to the one observed in the data, with the share invested fixed to 0.45.
4 Average share conditional on participation, in percent.
However, there are two features of the data that participation costs cannot explain.
First of all, there is a large fraction of households that do not own risky assets even at
high level of wealth. As an example, in the table we report also the hypothetic fixed cost
necessary to explain the decision to not invest in the risky asset of every non participat-
ing investor in the sample. As can be seen, we would be forced to assume implausibly
high values for the fixed cost.
Second, participation costs cannot account for the considerable drop in participation
that we report in table 2.1. In the table we compute also the value of fixed costs that
generates a participation rate equal to the one observed in the data. The computation
is very simple: we assume that participation is related to wealth only and since a given
value of the cost determines a wealth threshold that triggers participation, we select the
level of the cost that exactly individuates the percentile along the wealth distribution
that corresponds to the rate of non participation observed. To be more clear, let us con-
sider for example participation in 2006. The participation rate is 11.2% and the average
share equals 48.2%. Following the computation described before we find a cost equal
to 1,026.4 euros. In order to allow an easier interpretation of the evolution of these costs
over time, we also repeat the same computation but fixing α∗ equal to 0.45. Indeed,
costs in a specific year are determined by the participation rate, the corresponding per-
centile of the distribution of financial wealth and the share invested. Hence, setting a
fixed α∗ we limit the sources of variability only to changes in financial wealth and in the
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participation rates. It is clear, looking at table 2.1 that to be able to explain the drop in
participation fixed costs should have increased throughout the years. But it is very un-
likely that this happened, if anything, instead, the access to stock and financial products
such as mutual funds should have became easier, thanks to the technological progress
and the progressive development of financial markets in Italy occurred especially in the
first half of the 2000s.
To conclude this analysis, we replicate a more ambitious exercise proposed by
Vissing-Jørgensen (2004) in which we allow the fixed cost to be heterogenous across
households. Equation (2.7) defines the condition that should induce households to par-
ticipate in the stock market. With the assumptions we made above, that is, that α∗ is
the same (0.45) and that the adjusted equity premium equals 0.04, we have been able
to calculate the distribution of the benefit and the corresponding cost needed to explain
household’s observed decision. However, an homogenous participation cost implies that
the wealth threshold derived in equation (2.8) splits the population into non participants
and participants. Instead, allowing for the fixed cost to vary across households could
explain different choices by households with similar characteristics, that is, with similar
levels of financial wealth.
A simple approach to estimate the cross-section distribution of the participation cost
is the following: we start observing that the benefit is linear in wealth, so individuals
with the same level of wealth would potentially have the same gains from the invest-
ment. If we observe that in a given wealth range the participation rate is x%, we can
therefore conclude that condition (2.7) holds for x% of the households, and the fixed
cost they face is lower than the benefit, while the opposite is true for the remaining
1 − x%. By dividing the sample into 10 deciles of liquid financial wealth we can esti-
mate 10 points on the cumulative distribution function of the fixed cost. Clearly, such
CDF never reaches one, as we do not observe complete participation at any level of
wealth. Figure 2.2 shows the result of this computation in four years of the SHIW. For
the interpretation of figure 2.2 there are two elements that we have to address. First, we
see that this CDF shifted down across the years. That means that within each decile,
a larger fraction of households must have costs higher than the benefit, since they do
not participate. For what regards the benefit, we see that it varies throughout the years,
since wealth changed. In particular, the cost needed to explain non participation at the
highest decile was higher than 5000 euros in 2000, but it declined substantially over the
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Figure 2.2: Cumulative density function of the participation cost.
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years. In the other deciles, however, financial wealth declined less, and the changes in
the level of costs that explains non participation are less pronounced. Figure 2.2 overall
confirms our previous findings that even a low fixed costs may explain non participation
of poor households. At the same time, it shows that more than the 50% of households
in the top decile of financial wealth should face a cost higher than 3000 euros in 2014
in order to justify their non participation. Such value is clearly not plausible, thus other
factors are needed in order to explain the stock holding puzzle.
2.2 Portfolio choice and trust
In the previous section we showed how participation costs can affect household portfo-
lio choice and how they can help in addressing the stock holding puzzle. However, from
the explanation above, it is also clear that costs only cannot fully explain the puzzle: in
particular, fixed costs are not able to account for the lack of risky investment observed
at high level of wealth and for the decline of participation over time. Moreover, partic-
ipation costs must differ very much across countries in order to explain the wide cross
country differences we observe. In order to explain these features of the data, Guiso
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et al. (2008) introduce subjective trust in the asset choice framework. To see how trust
enters the picture, let us go back, for the moment to the simple framework described
by equation (2.1). As before, only two assets are available to households: a safe one,
which pays a return rf with certainty, and a risky one that pays a random return r˜. We
further assume that the random return is normally distributed, r˜ ∼ N(r¯, σ2). Following
Guiso et al. (2008), trust is modeled as a subjective probability p of being cheated in the
stock market. If cheating occurs, then the value of the investment in the risky asset will
be equal to zero. Taking this into account we can express investor’s next period wealth
as:
Wt(rf + α(r˜ − rf )) with probability (1− p),
Wt(1− α)rf with probability p.
(2.9)
In the following we will omit the time subscript for simplicity. Thus, investor seeks to
maximize:
max
α
(1− p)EU [W (rf + α(r˜ − rf ))] + pU [(1− α)Wrf ]. (2.10)
Equation (2.10) shows that when there is a non zero probability of being cheated, ex-
pected utility is given by a weighted average of the expected utility achieved if cheating
does not occur, with probability 1− p, and the utility obtained in case of cheating. The
first order condition in (2.2) now becomes:
(1−p)EU ′ [W (rf + α(r˜ − rf ))] (r˜−rf )W +pU ′ [(1− α)rfW ] (−rf )W = 0. (2.11)
We can interpret equation (2.11) in the following way: the first term represents the
marginal utility of investing an extra dollar in the risky asset when cheating does not
occur, while the second term is the marginal utility of investing in the risky asset when
cheating takes place. Now, if the investor does not invest in stocks (choosing α = 0),
the quantity above becomes just
(1− p)U ′ [Wrf ] (r¯ − rf )− pU ′ [Wrf ] (rf ) = 0, (2.12)
that can be rearranged into
U ′ [Wrf ] (r¯ − rf − pr¯) = 0. (2.13)
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Then if the quantity above is negative, it is not optimal to invest in the risky asset, and
α will be zero. Given that U ′(rf ) > 0 by definition, the LHS of (2.13) is greater than
zero, and so the investor will participate in the stock market, if and only if
p ≤ 1− rf
r¯
. (2.14)
Hence, there exists a lack of trust threshold p¯ such that an investor will never enter
the stock market. Moreover, it does not depend on the level of wealth, and so it is
particularly suited to explain why even wealthy households do not participate. This
threshold may be estimated: Guiso et al. (2008) assume the expected risky return equal
to 1.12 and the risk free rate equal to 1.05, obtaining that households with a subjective
probability of being cheated higher than 6.25% will not enter the stock market. Let us
now assume that p is lower than p¯. In this case it is optimal to invest a positive share α
in the risky asset, that we can obtain solving the first order condition:
(1− p)EU ′ [αr˜ + (1− α)rf ] (r¯ − rf ) = pU ′ [(1− α)rf ] (rf ). (2.15)
Solving this, we will find the optimal value α∗. How changing p will modify this α∗?
Obviously, if p increases the left hand side of (2.15) decreases, while the right hand side
increases. Thus, α has to adjust accordingly. Then we observe that the right hand side
is also increasing with α, for
d
dα
(pU ′ [(1− α)rf ] (rf )) = −pU ′′ [(1− α)rf ] (r2f ) > 0,
due to the concavity of U(·) (U ′′(·) < 0). This means that increasing α will increase the
right hand side of (2.15). In the same way, by the concavity of the utility function, we
have
d
dα
(
(1− p)EU ′(αr˜+(1− α)rf)(r¯ − rf )) =
= (1− p)EU ′′(αr˜ + (1− α)rf)(r¯ − rf )2 < 0.
Hence, increasing α will decrease the left hand side of (2.15). Clearly, this implies
that if the investor’s lack of trust p increases, his optimal share α∗ decreases or, higher
level trust gives higher values of the optimal share. As an example, let us assume the
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investor has an exponential utility function, U(W ) = −e−θW , where θ is the coefficient
of (constant) absolute risk aversion. Making use of the fact that the risky asset return
are normally distributed with mean r¯ and variance σ2 equation (2.15) becomes:
(1−p)(−e−θ(αr¯W+(1−α)rfW− θ2σ2(αW )2))(−θWr¯+θWrf+θ2ασ2W 2)+p(−e−θ(1−α)rfW )(θWrf ),
(2.16)
where we used the fact that if X ∼ N(µ, σ2) then
E(eX) = eµ+
σ2
2 . (2.17)
Equation (2.16) may be reduced to
α∗ =
r¯ − rf
θσ2W
− prf
(1− p)Aθσ2W , (2.18)
where A = e−θ(αr¯W−
θ
2
σ2(αW )2).
We are now interested in combining the results of these two sections, and see how
trust does affect the participation decision in the presence of a fixed cost. Similarly to
(2.4) the investor chooses α∗ that solves the following maximization problem:
max
α
(1− p)EU [(W − f)(rf + α(r˜ − rf ))] + pU [(1− α)(W − f)rf ] ; (2.19)
and participate in the stock market if
(1− p)EU [(W − f)(rf + α∗(r˜ − rf ))] + pU [(1− α∗)(W )rf ] ≥ U [Wrf ]. (2.20)
Obviously, there is still a level of mistrust such that if p > p¯ the investor will not enter
into the market. We can show that this threshold is lower than in the case without
participation cost. To prove it, let us start with considering the participation condition
implied by (2.14) in the absence of participation costs, that is, if p = p¯ the investor is
indifferent between participating and non participating:
(1− p¯)EU [(W )(rf + α(r˜ − rf ))] + p¯U [(1− α)(W − f)rf ] = U [Wrf ] . (2.21)
Inserting a participation cost f lowers the LHS of (2.21) while the RHS remains the
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same. Since
U [W ]
dW
> 0, that is, U is increasing in wealth, it follows that
(1− p¯)EU [(W − f)(rf + α(r˜ − rf ))] + p¯U [(1− α)(W − f)rf ] =
= EU [(W − f)(rf + α(r˜ − rf ))]−
p¯ (EU [(W − f)(rf + α(r˜ − rf ))]− U [(1− α)(W − f)rf ]) < U [Wrf ].
(2.22)
Since EU [(W − f)(rf + α(r˜ − rf ))]− U [(1− α)(W − f)rf ] > 0, it follows that for
f > 0 p¯ must decrease in order for the above expression to hold with equality.
Similarly, Guiso et al. (2008) show that also the wealth threshold defined in equation
(2.8) is lower when the investor perceives the risk of being cheated in the stock market.
Figure 2.3: Simulation of optimal asset allocation with different levels of trust and risk aversion.
Optimal share
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
E[U]
Full trust
p = 0.005
p = 0.015
p = 0.020
p = 0.025
Safe asset
Simulation assumes a CRRA utility function. Parameters: W = 25, 000,
γ = 3, f = 200, rf = 1.05. Random returns are assumed normally
distributed, r˜ ∼ N(r¯, σ2); r¯ = 1.12, σ2 = 0.05.
Figure 2.3 shows the results of a simulation corresponding to equation (2.20). We
assumed a CRRA utility function, in the form U (·) = ·
1−γ
1− γ . A strong implication of
the CRRA utility function is that the optimal share invested in risky asset is not related
to wealth, since relative risk aversion is constant. With a Monte Carlo approach, we
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simulate 1 million of realizations of the random return on the risky asset, and we then
compute the expected utility for different levels of α. The figure shows expected utility
corresponding to different values of mistrust as a function of α. The dashed line instead
represents the utility from investing in the risk free asset only (i.e α = 0). As specified
in equation (2.20), households compare the expected utility from choosing the optimal
α with the utility from investing in the risk free asset only. As we can see, with this
particular set of parameter, an investor with financial wealth equal to 25,000, that faces
a fixed cost equal to 200, with constant relative risk aversion equal to 3 would not par-
ticipate in the stock market if she perceives a probability of 2.5% of being cheated. The
assumption of a fixed cost of 200 euros seems reasonable, as such value is able to ex-
plain non participation of around two thirds of non participants, depending on the year.
However, as we have highlighted in the previous section, assuming that fixed costs are
homogenous across the population, does not take into account the individual component
of such costs, which is related to the (non monetary) cost of acquiring information and
take decisions. But estimating the value of these costs is in any case very difficult, and
making arbitrary assumptions cannot be avoided. Thus, we assume that these 200 euros
represent a fixed monetary cost common to all investors, and, more unrealistically, that
each investor decides on the basis of a common information set. Hence, the decision is
driven only by the investor’s level of trust and risk aversion.
Figure 2.5a shows the wealth threshold that triggers investment in risky assets as a
function of the (mis) trust parameter p, for three different levels of risk aversion. First
of all, we notice how the presence of a fixed cost (again, we set it equal to 200 euros)
reduces the level of mistrust below which individuals do not invest. Above, we have
shown how a lack of trust of p¯ = 0.0625 was sufficient to explain non participation,
in the absence of fixed costs. From figure 2.5a we see first of all how inserting a par-
ticipation cost significantly lowers such threshold p¯1. From figure 2.5a we see how the
wealth threshold increases with trust. Let us focus on the baseline case with γ = 3.
The wealth threshold when trust is zero and the fixed cost is 200 euros, is equivalent to
12,400 euros. Such threshold grows very fast as p increases. Moreover, if the fixed cost
1Note, however, that the result that investors with p < 0.0625 will not participate holds independently
from individual characteristics, such as risk aversion, wealth and properties of the specific utility func-
tional form chosen; thus, it is a much stronger result than the one shown in figure 2.5a. There we see
that the exact level of p¯ depends on individual risk aversion. It does not depend on wealth, given our
specification of a CRRA utility function.
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Figure 2.4: Trust, the wealth threshold and the optimal share.
(a) Wealth threshold and the level of trust, for different levels of γ, the coef-
ficient of relative risk aversion.
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(b) Optimal share invested in stocks and the level of trust, for different levels
of γ, the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
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Simulation assumes a CRRA utility function. Parameters: W = 25, 000,
γ = 3, f = 200, rf = 1.05. Random returns are assumed normally
distributed, r˜ ∼ N(r¯, σ2); r¯ = 1.12, σ2 = 0.05.
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equals 200 euros, an investor with a relative risk aversion of 3 would not invest in the
stock market if her perceived probability of being cheated exceeds 4%.
Moreover, we see that a higher (lower) level of risk aversion implies a higher (lower)
wealth threshold at each level of trust. The effect of varying the level of the fixed cost
is very similar, intuitively. But what about the optimal share invested, conditional on
participation?
Figure 2.5b is derived from the same simulation used to produce figure 2.5a and
shows the relationship between the optimal share invested conditional on participation
and trust. In line with the theoretical predictions above, we see that the higher the level
of p, the lower the optimal share α∗. Similarly to what we have seen regarding the
wealth threshold, the effect of an increase in the level of risk aversion further reduces
the optimal share. Intuitively, varying the amount of fixed costs does not impact the
optimal share: if the investor has a CRRA utility function and her wealth is higher than
the wealth threshold for investing, given a certain value of trust p, then the optimal
share invested will not depend on the value of the fixed costs or on wealth. Of course,
the magnitude of fixed costs impacts the participation decision through its effect on the
wealth threshold, but not the optimal share invested conditional on participation.
2.3 Expectations, preferences and portfolio choice
In the two previous sections we have highlighted how combining trust and portfolio
choice we can provide a theoretical explanation of the stock holding puzzle. There are
however two other elements that we have considered as given, but that can be determi-
nants of household risk taking: the degree of risk aversion and subjective expectations
of the portfolio returns. For what regards risk preferences, the literature pointed out
several factors that may affect household risk tolerance. An extensive review on the
role of risk aversion in household portfolio choice, the issue of measuring it and under-
standing its determinants can be found in Guiso and Sodini (2013). As we have already
mentioned, a crucial issue is understanding the relationship between risk aversion and
wealth. Models with constant relative risk aversion, as the classical consumption and
portfolio choice model in continuous time developed by Merton (1969), predict that the
share invested in the risky assets is determined only by the expected risk premium, the
variance of the return, and the degree of relative risk aversion. Specifically, the share
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invested by household i would be given by:
α∗i =
E(r˜ − rf )
σ2γi
, (2.23)
where, as before, r˜ and σ2 are the normally distributed, which we assume to be the same
for all households. Hence, the differences in the shares invested merely reflect differ-
ences in risk aversion. Hence, a first simple approach to measure risk aversion would
be to simply infer it from the (observed) share invested in risky assets. In particular, the
Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion γi may be estimated as
γi =
E(r˜ − rf )
σ2α∗i
(2.24)
We present the results of such computation in figure 2.6, setting the equity premium
Figure 2.6: P25-P75 range and median level of risk aversion inferred with the revealed preference ap-
proach, by country.
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Assumptions: r¯=1.12, rf = 1.05, σ2 = 0.05. Countries are sorted by the
participation rate in risky assets. Computed using survey weights.
to 0.07 and the variance of the risky return to 0.05. Perhaps surprisingly, we estimate
that the vast majority of households have reasonable levels of risk aversion, below ten.
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Moreover, the results are remarkably stable across countries. Two exceptions are Austria
and France, in which the 75th percentiles corresponds to 13.56 and 10.77, respectively.
Such approach, however, presents important limitations. First of all, it can be applied
only to households that hold some kind of risky assets, thus, it cannot help in explaining
non participation. Second, in each country there are some households who have a very
small share invested in risky assets, for which we estimate implausibly large values of
risk aversion. Guiso and Sodini (2013) point out two main reasons to explain this. First
of all, the measure obtained from equation (2.24) does not consider the relationship
between risk aversion and other characteristic of the household, such as wealth, back-
ground risk, past experience. Moreover, assuming that each household has the same
expectations about the mean and riskiness of the return, we are attributing to differences
in risk aversion all the differences in expectations that may be present in the data.
An alternative way to elicit risk aversion in survey contexts would be through qual-
itative questions. In both the HFCS and the SCF, subjective risk aversion is elicited
by asking: "Which of the following statements comes closest to the amount of financial
risk that you are willing to take when you make your financial investment? (1) Take
substantial financial risks expecting to earn substantial returns; (2) Take above average
financial risks expecting to earn above average returns; (3) Take average financial risks
expecting to earn average returns; (4) Not willing to take any financial risks". The com-
position of the answers in different countries is presented in figure 2.7, which reports
the percentage of answers in each country by risky asset ownership status. As can be
seen, risky asset participants in each country have a lower average self reported value
of risk aversion, compared to non participants. We see however that even among who
owns risky assets, a significant fraction reports to not want to bear any financial risk at
all. We may be concerned that even in this category, many households do not have risky
investment in practice, since we considered as risky the entire amount invested in mutual
funds and retirement accounts. We checked indeed that such pattern is still there even if
we consider stock owners only. Regarding the cross country differences, we notice that
in the United States the fraction of households that answered one or two is significantly
higher than in every European country. Surprisingly, Italy is the country with the lowest
average self reported risk aversion and it is also the country with the lowest share of four
answers among non participants. Such share ranges from slightly less than 70% in Italy,
to more than 90% in Belgium, Cyprus, France, Latvia, Spain, Poland and Portugal. In
64
2.3. Expectations, preferences and portfolio choice
Figure 2.7: Composition of self-reported risk aversion by participation status in risky assets.
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Figure 2.9: Correlation between average self reported risk aversion (y-axis) and risky asset participation
rate.
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figure 2.9 we show the relationship between average self reported risk aversion and the
participation rate in risky assets, by country. We see that overall there is a slightly neg-
ative correlation between the two measures, but there are also significant outliers. This
measure of risk aversion has the advantage that it comes from a question easy to ask in
surveys which lead to a very few non responses. However, it has the drawback that dif-
ferences in the answers may be due not only to differences in individual risk aversion,
but also differences in the perception of risks. Indeed, this may also explain why we
observe large differences in the country averages. Some respondents may appear more
risk averse than they actually are if they place higher probabilities on adverse events.
In the literature the determinants of risk averse behaviour have been widely investi-
gated. A complete discussion of such literature is beyond the scope of this chapter. In
the following we will briefly present the main evidences, mainly following the review
made in Guiso and Sodini (2013). As we have already mentioned, a key focus has been
posed on identifying the relationship between financial wealth and risk aversion. The
most common specification that has been tested in the literature assumes that γ, the
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Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion, is given by
γi =
λi
W ηi
. (2.25)
Note that η = −1 implies constant absolute risk aversion and η = 0 implies constant
relative risk aversion. Values of η in the (-1,0) interval corresponds to declining absolute
risk aversion and increasing relative risk aversion, while values above zero imply that
both absolute and relative risk aversion are decreasing. Combining (2.25) with (3.19)
and taking logs, suggests the following regression
ln γi = ξi + η ln Wi + i, (2.26)
where ξi =
r¯ − rf
λiσ2
is an individual fixed effect that capture unobservable factors that
affect risk aversion. In a cross sectional context, that is, treating ξ as common to all
households, η is usually found positive, supporting the conclusion that average investor
has DRRA preferences.
There are other factors, apart from wealth, that have been pointed out in the liter-
ature as affecting risk aversion. The presence of background risks, for example, can
increase aversion to risk if these risk cannot be insured due to market incompleteness.
In particular, the literature focused on the role of human capital, housing wealth and
private business wealth. Concerning the first, in a life cycle model agents who have to
rely on an uncertain stream of income that they cannot insure, have a higher degree of
risk aversion. Gollier (2002) shows that in the presence of an independent background
risk, the agent utility function becomes more convex, if the utility function belongs to
the class that he calls "risk vulnerable" utility functions, among which the CRRA utility
function is included.
About the role of housing, we have already mentioned that many studies predict that
housing should reduce household demand for risky assets, since it increases household
exposure to risk and illiquidity. Cocco (2005) proposes a life cycle model in which
households optimize their expected utility from consumption and can invest in housing,
risk-free and risky financial assets. In his framework, investing heavily in housing re-
duces financial wealth, thus lowering the potential benefit from stock market investing,
and may lead to non participation. He finds also that house price risk crowds out stock
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holding, especially for what concerns households with low financial wealth. Sinai and
Souleles (2005) provide an alternative explanation of the role of housing in influenc-
ing households risk attitudes. They develop a model to analyze the tradeoff between
renting and owning the residence. Since every one needs to live somewhere, every one
is exposed to fluctuations in rent prices. Thus, buying a house might serve as a hedge
against this risk, as it ensures a certain flow of housing services in exchange of a known
upfront payment. Homeowners, even if hedged against rent risk, are exposed to house
price risk. However, if they do not move, such risk does not affect household behaviour
since the eventual loss from a decline in the property value is never realized. Hence,
the overall effect of housing on risk taking is not clear, a priori. If house price risk
prevails, then housing reduces household investment in risky assets; conversely, if rent
risk is greater or the household does not consider to move, then homeowners may have
a higher propensity to invest in risky assets than non homeowners. A recent study that
investigates both these aspects is Chetty et al. (2017). They find that an increase in
property value, holding wealth fixed (thus, with a corresponding increase in mortgage
debt), increases household risk aversion and reduces their propensity to participate i the
stock market. On the other side, an increase in home equity, defined as property value
minus mortgage debt, holding property value fixed, increases stockholding. Specifically
on this issue, Chetty et al. (2017) report an elasticity of the risky share with respect to
mortgage debt of -0.2. On the other side, an increase in home equity, holding property
value fixed, has the opposite effect on household risk taking behaviour, and they find an
elasticity of the share with respect to home equity approximatively equal to 0.3. These
results are in line with previous literature in two ways: first, housing wealth exacerbates
household risk aversion due to its illiquidity. Second, they point out that mortgage debt,
and the commitment to make regular mortgage payments, exacerbates this illiquidity.
Chetty et al. (2017) argue that in the 2000s, the increase in mortgage debt and the in-
crease in the illiquidity of the housing market in the U.S., may have been concurrent
factors in exacerbating household risk aversion and reducing the demand for stocks.
Figure 2.10 shows the correlation between the home ownership rate and the average
self reported risk aversion. As can be seen, the relationship is positive, and it would be
even more so if we excluded Italy, United States, Austria and Malta, that represents four
significant outliers since they have far lower average risk aversion.
Another determinant of risk aversion that has been investigated is past macroeco-
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Figure 2.10: The correlation between average self reported risk aversion and home ownership rate.
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nomic experience. In particular Malmendier and Nagel (2011) show that the stock mar-
ket performance experienced over the lifetime is strongly correlated with stock own-
ership. Using SCF data, they show that individuals who grew up in periods of high
stock market volatility and experienced strong downturns are less likely to invest in
stock. Similar evidence for Europe comes from Ampudia and Ehrmann (2017b), who
employed data from the first wave of the HFCS. In both these analysis, a crucial aspect
is how individuals weight past experiences. Both papers point to the fact that house-
holds seem to attach a higher weight to more recent experiences. Moreover, Ampudia
and Ehrmann (2017b) find evidences that the memory of stock market crashes is more
persistent than the one of booms.
The above analysis naturally leads to a crucial question: does risk aversion fluctuate
over time, responding to developments in the external environment, or is it a relatively
stable characteristic of investor? Guiso et al. (2013) analyze the change in both a quan-
titative and qualitative measure of risk aversion using data from the Unicredit Customer
Survey between 2007 and 2009. They find substantial shifts in both measures, following
the financial crisis. They also show that trust and risk aversion are strongly related: indi-
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viduals whose trust has increased or remained stable exhibits a very contained increase
in risk aversion, compared to those whose trust worsened between the two surveys 2.
Figure 2.11: Risk aversion over time in Italy.
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Figure 2.11 shows the composition of answers to the qualitative risk aversion ques-
tion in the SHIW throughout the years. We present the chart for all household to-
gether, since splitting by risky asset ownership may give a biased measure, given that
the changes in risk aversion and the participation decision are correlated. From the chart
we notice that the increase in risk aversion has been especially strong between 2010 and
2012, following the sovereign debt crisis. It has been, instead, much less pronounced
between 2006 and 2008. This is coherent with the macro economic dynamics of the
last decade. Indeed, the two crisis affected households very differently: the sovereign
debt crisis, indeed, has been followed by a strong rise in unemployment and a decline
in house prices. These two elements did not characterize, instead, the financial crisis of
2007-2008. Hence, we can conjecture that the drivers of the changes in risk aversion
2In Guiso et al. (2013) the predictive power of a change in trust on the change in risk aversion is strong
both for a qualitative measure of risk aversion and a quantitative measure, inferred through the revealed
preference approach.
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have been different. In 2006-2008, it is likely that trust in the financial markets and a
change in the perception of financial risks led households to self report higher level of
risk aversion. In the period 2010-2012, instead, factors as higher income risk, declining
house prices and worse expectations about the economic situation are likely the drivers
of the increase in risk aversion.
Another element that has been emphasized in the literature as an explanation of
the limited stock market participation is financial literacy. Lusardi and Mitchell (2014)
provides a survey of the vast literature devoted to the topic. They define financial liter-
acy as "peoples’ ability to process economic information and make informed decisions
about financial planning, wealth accumulation, pensions, and debt". Financial liter-
acy has been linked to stock market participation (van Rooij et al., 2011), to portfolio
diversification (Guiso and Jappelli, 2009), retirement savings (Lusardi and Mitchell,
2011). In order to explain the participation puzzle, financial literacy has been linked to
participation costs. As we have described above, participation costs have a monetary
component and a non monetary component, linked to the time spent acquiring informa-
tion. Clearly, this second component is likely to be individual specific: individuals with
a better knowledge of the financial markets and with better cognitive abilities should,
in principle, need to put less efforts in the process of acquiring information. Jappelli
and Padula (2015) argue that financial literacy is itself an endogenous variable and that
households decide how much to invest in financial literacy simultaneously with their
other decisions related to consumption and portfolio allocation. Jappelli and Padula
(2015) develop a model in which financial literacy affects positively the returns from
the risky asset and negatively the cost. The predictions of their model are consistent
with the data: financial literacy and stock ownership are correlated, as well as the ac-
cumulation of financial literacy and wealth over the life cycle. Moreover, their model
implies that the higher the level of social security, the lower the incentive for house-
holds to invest in financial literacy. Using data from the Survey on Health, Ageing and
Retirement in Europe, they show how this prediction is matched in the data.
Finally, it is clear that subjective expectations on the return and the variance of the
stock market play a key role in determining investors’ choices. A factor that, at a first
observation, seems indicating a role for household expectations is that the relationship
between the participation rate and the performance of the stock market. As we pre-
sented before, Guiso and Jappelli (2002) have shown how the ’90s witnessed a strong
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increase in the fraction of households investing in the stock market. As shown above,
the participation rate peaked in 2000, at the end of a period of stock market boom in
Italy. Participation declined significantly between 2002 and and 2006, though house-
hold wealth increased during this period and the stock market witnessed another boom,
as shown in figure 1.1 and 6b. After the second big crash of the 2000s, when the FTSE
MIB lost more than the 50% between mid-2007 and the end of 2008, participation de-
clined to very low levels, similar to the ones observed at the beginning of the ’90s. So,
at first glance, it seems that households expectations and behaviour responded strongly
to the poor performance of the Italian stock market, and in particular to the shock at the
beginning of the century. Clearly, such a speculation must be taken with caution, since
the international equity market through mutual funds became easier to access. However
many other works have analyzed how a strong home bias remains present. Measuring
expectations in a survey context poses some challenges. Manski (2004) argues in favour
of the measurement through probabilistic questions, that is, asking respondents to report
the probability of earning a positive return investing in the stock market within a certain
horizon (typically one year). This kind of answers may then be used to infer, given
an assumption on the distribution of expected returns, the moments of the subjective
distribution. Such methodology is followed, for example, by Hudomiet et al. (2011).
Unfortunately, the data available in the SHIW do not allow us to perform a similar ex-
ercise. Such questions have been asked only after the financial crisis, in the 2008, 2010
and 2012 waves. Moreover many households do not answer the questions, or provide
inconsistent answers3. Particularly striking is also the fact that a large fraction of those
who answer the questions attach a probability equal to zero to achieve a positive return
in the stock market4. In our interpretation, this is due in part to a poor understanding of
the probabilistic question and in part to a deep lack of trust in the stock market.
3An example of inconsistent answer is if the respondent attaches a higher probability to achieve a
return of at least 10% than the probability attached to a positive return.
4Specifically, 22.9% in 2008, 24.5% in 2010 and 33.2% in 2012.
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This chapter is devoted to our empirical analysis. In particular, we study the determi-
nants of risky asset ownership and the likelihood of changes in the participation sta-
tus. For what regards the first aspect, we follow the estimation framework proposed
by Miniaci and Weber (2002). In particular, the discrete choice variable indicating par-
ticipation, may be studied in a static or dynamic framework. We limit ourselves to the
former. Static models of portfolio choice in a panel data context present the challenge of
modeling the unobservable individual disturbances. In the first specification, we assume
that such disturbance is negligible, and, thus, we can apply a standard cross section logit
model in which we pool together all the observations. Then, we present the results of
two other specifications: one in which the unobservable idiosyncratic term is treated
as random and one in which, instead, it is treated as a fixed effect. In section one we
theoretically describe these framework, while section two is devoted to the presentation
of the results. In section three, instead, we employ a bivariate probit analysis, follow-
ing Bilias et al. (2010), to account jointly for the participation status in two consecutive
periods.
3.1 Econometric models of portfolio choice
In the description of the econometric framework we closely follow Greene (2003). In
first place, we want to study if and when households own risky assets. From the econo-
metric point view, this implies using a binary choice model, in which we are interested
in estimating the effect (β) of a change in the explanatory variables (x) on the probability
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of investing in risky assets; formally, we have:
Pr (Y = 1|x) = F (x, β)
Pr (Y = 0|x) = 1− F (x, β).
(3.1)
The problem is to find a suitable form for F (·). One possibility is to retain the linear
regression framework, so that
F (x, β) = x′β, (3.2)
and since E(y|x) = F (x, β) we can construct the regression model as
y = E(y|x) + (y − E(y|x)) = x′β + . (3.3)
Because x′β +  must be equal to zero or one,  equals x′β or 1 − x′β, and it can be
easily shown that the variance of the error term is
Var(|x) = x′β + (1− x′β). (3.4)
Thus, the error is heteroskedastic in a way that depends on β. Such complication could
be solved using, for example, a feasible generalized least square estimator to correct
for the heteroskedasticity of the error term. One more serious shortcoming of the linear
probability model is that we cannot be sure that the predictions of such model will look
like probabilities, a priori. In order to produce predictions consistent with (3.1), we need
that the function F (·) satisfies the following conditions:
lim
x′β→+∞
Pr(Y = 1|x) = lim
x′β→+∞
F (x′β) = 1
lim
x′β→−∞
Pr(Y = 0|x) = lim
x′β→−∞
F (x′β) = 0.
(3.5)
In principle, any proper, continuous probability distribution defined over the real line
would respect those conditions. Two distributions that respect the properties above and
have been widely used in applications are the normal distribution, giving rise to the
probit model,
Pr(Y = 1|x) =
∫ x′β
−∞
φ(t)dt = Φ(x′β), (3.6)
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and the logistic distribution
Pr(Y = 1|x) = e
x′β
1 + ex′β
= Λ(x′β). (3.7)
Finally, the probability model is defined as a regression
E(y|x) = 0(1− F (x′β) + 1(F (x′β)) = F (x′β). (3.8)
It is important to remark the fact that the non linearity of the model implies that the
parameters estimated do not represent the marginal effects of x on y as in the linear
regression framework. In general, we have that
∂E(y|x)
∂x
=
(
∂F (x′β)
∂(x′β)
)
β = f(x′β)β. (3.9)
In the probit case, this is equivalent to
∂E(y|x)
∂x
= φ(x′β)β, (3.10)
while in the logit case we have
∂Λ(x′β)
∂(x′β)
=
ex
′β
(1 + ex′β)2
= Λ(x′β)(1− Λ(x′β)), (3.11)
thus
∂E(y|x)
∂x
= Λ(x′β)(1− Λ(x′β))β. (3.12)
It is clear that these marginal effects vary with x. In order to interpret the model, it will
be useful to compute such effects at relevant levels of x (e.g. at the mean). As we will
see later, another alternative is to compute the marginal effect for each observation in
the sample, and then take the average of these marginal effects. Estimation of non linear
binary choice models is usually based on the method of maximum likelihood. Each
observation i is treated as a random draw from a Bernoulli distribution. Assuming that
observations are independent, the joint probability, or likelihood function is defined as
Pr (Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2, . . . , Yn = yn|X) =
∏
yi=0
(1− F (x′iβ))
∏
yi=1
F (x′iβ), (3.13)
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which may conveniently be written as
L(β|data) =
n∏
i=1
(F (x′iβ))
yi(1− F (x′iβ))1−yi . (3.14)
Taking logs, we obtain the log likelihood function
ln L =
n∑
i=1
yi ln F (x′iβ) + (1− yi) ln(1− F (x′iβ)), (3.15)
and in the case of symmetric distributions, as the normal or the logistic, since 1 −
F (xiβ) = F (−xiβ), defining qi = 2yi − 1, this can be further simplified into
ln L =
n∑
i=1
ln F (qix′iβ). (3.16)
A useful formulation of discrete choice models is the latent regression formulation. In
this context the outcome of the binary is seen as the reflection of an underlying regres-
sion. Assuming that y∗i is desired share of risky assets in the portfolio for household i,
we want to study the probability Pr(yi = 1), where
y∗i = x
′
iβ + 
yi =
1 if y∗i > 00, if y∗i ≤ 0
(3.17)
if short sales are not permitted. In this formulation, x′iβ is called the index function.
Such models assume that the distribution of  is known, and corresponds to a standard
normal distribution with mean 1 in the probit case and a standardized logistic distribu-
tion with variance pi2/3. Assuming that the variance is known is an innocent assump-
tion, as we can scale both y∗ and β by an unrestricted parameter without effects on the
outcome variable y. In other words, this means that there is no information about the
variance of the error term in the data, and it cannot be estimated.
Since we want to perform our analysis using panel data, we have to extend the model
of the previous section to account for the time dimension. If ownership is indepen-
dent over time, then the joint probability of (yi1, ..., yiT ) is given by Pr(yi1, ..., yiT ) =
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∏T
t=1 Pr(yit). Hence, such assumption implies:
Pr (yit = 1|yit−1 = 1) = Pr (yit = 1) . (3.18)
In this case, the model can be consistently estimated using standard cross sections bi-
nary response models where the number of observations in NT instead of N . However,
Miniaci and Weber (2002) point out two main reasons because of which equation (3.18)
may fail to hold. The first one is heterogeneity: households are characterized by some
unobservable characteristics that affect their risk aversion and their information set and,
thus, their attitude towards risky assets investment. The second one is true state depen-
dence, that is, current ownership is directly affected by past ownership, as it would be
the case if, for example, investors learned by their experience holding assets. True state
dependence is consistent with some theoretical models that predict that transaction costs
or cumulated experience through asset ownership affect household decisions. Generally,
we can specify a linear model in which the desired risky share depends linearly on a set
of strictly exogenous variables xit and on the ownership status at t− 1, yit−1:
y∗it = βx
′
it + γyit−1 + it, (3.19)
where xit is a 1 ×K vector of strictly exogenous independent variables. If there is no
true state dependance, then γ = 0. We thus have a static discrete choice model, that we
can write as
y∗it = x
′
itβ + it
yit =
1 if it > −x′itβ0, if it ≤ −x′itβ
it = αi + uit,
(3.20)
where the error term it is decomposed into a time invariant component αi related to
unobservable characteristics of the household, such as risk aversion, and a time varying
effect uit, such as expectation errors or individual income innovations. Assuming that
F (·) is the cumulative distribution function of the random variable it, we have:
E (yit|xit) = Pr (yit = 1|xit) = F (βx′it) . (3.21)
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If we assume that unobservable individual heterogeneity is negligible, then equation
(3.18) holds, and we can consistently estimate β from a single cross-sections. If instead
the individual time invariant effect is not negligible, we can treat αi as a random or fixed
variable. In the first case, we assume that αi is unrelated to xit, so that the conditional
distribution f(ui|xit) is not dependent on xit. If we relax this restriction, allowing ui
and xit to be correlated, then we have a fixed effect model. Specifically, the random
effect model requires:
E (αi|xi) = E (uit|xi) = 0
V ar (it|αi, xi) = σ2u + σ2α = 1 + σ2α
Corr (it, is|xi) = ρ = σ
2
α
1 + σ2α
,
(3.22)
where xi = (xi1, ..., xiT ). In the cross section case, the probability associated with an
observation is
Pr (yi|xi) =
∫ Ui
Li
f(i)di, (3.23)
where
(Li, Ui) =
(−∞,−x′iβ) if yi = 0(−x′iβ,∞) if yi = 1 (3.24)
This simplifies to Φ[(2yi − 1)x′iβ] for the normal distribution and Λ[(2yi − 1)x′iβ] for
the logit model, as we have shown in equation (3.16). In the general case with an un-
restricted covariance matrix, the contribution of households i to the likelihood function
would be the joint probability for all observations Ti:
Li = Pr(yi1, . . . , yiTi |xi) =
∫ UiTi
LiTi
. . .
∫ Ui1
Li1
f(i1, i2, . . . , iTi)di1di2 . . . diTi . (3.25)
The integration of the joint density as it is in the previous equation is impractical in most
cases. However, Greene (2003) shows how the joint density of uit can be obtained by
integrating αi out of the joint density of (i1, i2, . . . , iTi , αi), which is given by
f(i1, i2, . . . , iTi , αi) = f(i1, i2, . . . , iTi |αi)f(αi). (3.26)
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So
f(i1, i2, . . . , iTi) =
∫ ∞
−∞
f(i1, i2, . . . , iTi |αi)f(αi)dαi; (3.27)
this formulation has the advantage that the i’s are independent conditioned on αi, and
thus the previous expression becomes
f(i1, i2, . . . , iTi) =
∫ ∞
−∞
Ti∏
t=1
f(it|αi)f(αi)dαi. (3.28)
Inserting this result in equation (3.25) we obtain
Li = Pr(yi1, . . . , yiTi |xi) =
∫ UiTi
LiTi
. . .
∫ Ui1
Li1
∫ ∞
−∞
Ti∏
t=1
f(it|αi)f(αi)dαidi1di2 . . . diTi ,
(3.29)
and since the ranges of integration are independent, we can change the order of integra-
tion
Li = Pr(yi1, . . . , yiTi |xi) =
∫ ∞
−∞
[∫ UiTi
LiTi
. . .
∫ Ui1
Li1
Ti∏
t=1
f(it|αi)di1di2 . . . diTi
]
f(αi)dαi.
(3.30)
Finally, since the ’s are independent conditioned on the common αi, the term in square
brackets equals the product of the individual probabilities:
Li = Pr(yi1, . . . , yiTi |xi) =
∫ ∞
−∞
[
Ti∏
t=1
(∫ Uit
Lit
f(it|αi)dit
)]
f(αi)dαi. (3.31)
The individual densities in the product are now, conditioned on αi, the familiar probabil-
ities for the individual observations, computed at x′itβ as in equation (3.23). Collecting
all terms, we obtain a general random effects binary choice model:
Li = Pr(yi1, . . . , yiTi |xi) =
∫ ∞
−∞
[
Ti∏
t=1
Pr (Yit = yit|x′itβ + αi)
]
f(αi)dαi. (3.32)
Note that such result holds for any symmetric probability function f(·), it can thus be
applied to both probit and logit models. The conditional independence assumption for
the ’s with respect to α allows to simplify the T -dimensional integral in equation (3.25)
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into the one dimensional integral above. Still, however, the computation of the outer in-
tegral is not trivial. Assuming that αi is normally distributed, as αi ∼ N (0, σ2α), the
Butler and Moffitt’s method can be applied, which relies on the Gauss-Hermit quadra-
ture to approximate the integral 1. This is the method applied by the Stata routines
xtprobit and xtlogit, when the options random effect is specified.
Alternatively, the fixed effect model is specified as:
y∗it = αidi + βx
′
it + it,
yit =
1 if it > −αidi − x′itβ0, if it ≤ −αidi − x′itβ
(3.33)
With respect to the random effects framework, treating αi as a fixed effect allows us to
relax the assumption of zero correlation between αi and xi. In the fixed effect models,
the distribution of αi is unrestricted. The terminology should not, however, be mislead-
ing: indeed, in a fixed effect framework, αi can be a constant term as well as a random
variable, and the term "fixed" does not refer to any intrinsic characteristic of the effect
itself. In this setting, we may be interested in estimating both the K elements of β and
the n individual constant terms. Clearly, the number of these parameters may be huge
in a typical applications, posing practical difficulties to the estimation. Following again
Greene (2003), the log likelihood function of the fixed effects model is:
ln L =
n∑
1=1
Ti∑
t=1
ln Pr (yit|αi + x′itβ) , (3.34)
where the probability of the observed outcome is given by a cumulative density function,
Φ(·) in the probit case or Λ(·) in the logit. Such estimator suffers from the so called
incidental parameters problem. Indeed, the estimation of the individual unobserved
fixed effects, αi, relies on Ti observations. Thus, such estimator is consistent when
Ti tends to infinity, however, in most of the applications Ti is fixed, and usually also
quite small. As a consequence, the estimators of the constant terms are not consistent.
Moreover, the estimator of β is a function of the estimators of α, so that the MLE
1An in depth description of the Butler and Moffit’s algorithm may be found in Greene (2003), pp.550-
554.
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estimation of β is not consistent either 2. In the linear case the incidental parameters
problem is circumvented transforming the data into deviations from group means. In
that context, even if f(yit|xi) is a function of αi, f(yit|xi, y¯i) does not depend on αi,
and it is used in the estimation of β, then, y¯i is a sufficient statistic for αi. In the present,
non linear setting, a sufficient statistic is available for the logit model, but not for the
probit. The idea is thus to condition upon the sufficient statistic to obtain a conditional
likelihood function, which does not depend on α and may be consistently estimated.
Given the logistic assumption, we have
Pr(yit = 1|xit) = e
αi+x
′
itβ
1 + eαi+x
′
itβ
, (3.35)
and the unconditional likelihood for the nT independent observations is (from a gener-
alization to T periods of equation (3.14))
L =
∏
i
∏
t
F yitit (1− Fit)1−yit . (3.36)
Chamberlain (1980) observes that a sufficient statistic is given by Si =
∑Ti
t=1 yit, that
is, the number of times that yit = 1. The statistic is sufficient, since the conditional
likelihood function defined as
Lc =
n∏
i=1
Pr
(
Yi1 = yi1, Yi2 = yi2, . . . , YiTi = yiTi
∣∣ Ti∑
t=1
yit
)
(3.37)
is free of the incidental parameter αi. To practically illustrate this point, let us consider
an example in which Ti = 2. The unconditional likelihood, from equation (3.36), is
given by ∏
i
Pr (Yi1 = yi1) Pr (Yi2 = yi2) . (3.38)
For each n pair of observations, Si = yi1 + yi2 may be equal to zero, one or two. The
cases Si = 0 or Si = 2 are not informative on β. Indeed, for either of these cases, the
ith term in the conditional likelihood Lc defined in equation (3.37) is just one, so they
contribute nothing to Lc. When we take logs, these terms (and the corresponding obser-
2Miniaci and Weber (2002) note that in the linear case, the two ML estimators for αi and β are
independent of each other, thus it is possible to obtain consistent estimates of β independently of α.
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vations) will drop out. The only informative case is when Si = 1, that is, when some
transition from non ownership to ownership or viceversa has been observed. Assume
now that yi1 = 0 and yi2 = 1. Then,
Pr (yi1 = 0, yi2 = 1|Si = 1, αi, xi) = Pr (yi1 = 0, yi2 = 1) Pr (Si = 1|yi1 = 0, yi2 = 1)Pr (Si = 1) =
=
Pr (yi1 = 0, yi2 = 1)
Pr (yi1 = 0, yi2 = 1) Pr (yi1 = 1, yi2 = 0)
,
(3.39)
from the Bayes’ theorem. Therefore, for this pair of observations, the conditional prob-
ability is
1
1 + eαi+x
′
i1β
eαi+x
′
i2β
1 + eαi+x
′
i2β
1
1 + eαi+x
′
i1β
eαi+x
′
i2β
1 + eαi+x
′
i2β
+
eαi+x
′
i1β
1 + eαi+x
′
i1β
1
1 + eαi+x
′
i2β
=
ex
′
i2β
ex
′
i1β + ex
′
i2β
, (3.40)
which shows how by conditioning on the sum of the two observations we can remove
the heterogeneity. Therefore, we can construct the conditional likelihood function as
the product of these terms for the pair of observations for which the two observations
are (0,1). Analogously, we can include pairs of observations for which the two observa-
tions are (1,0). In a general framework, with an arbitrary Ti, the conditional likelihood
consists in the product of the terms such as the one defined in equation (3.40) for those
observation sets for which the sum is not zero or Ti. Then the maximization of the
log likelihood function is straightforward. Such estimation may be performed through
Stata by using the command xtlogit with the fixed effect options, or using the command
clogit, which implement the conditional logit model. Such estimator, indeed, is also
called conditional logit estimator.
From the discussion above it is clear that the conditional logit estimator has the
advantage of being more flexible than the random effect model, as it does not require
any assumption on the distribution or the variance structure of the unobserved αi; at
the same time however, to implement the estimation some variability in the dependent
variable is needed. Moreover, with conditional logit, the effect of time-invariant charac-
teristics, such as gender, cannot be estimated. In the context of risky asset participation,
the problem is compounded because the time dimension is usually small, and thus one
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cannot rely on conditional logit to estimate the effects of variable that are almost con-
stant, especially over a short horizon, such as education, region of residence and family
size. Guiso and Jappelli (2002) note also that the estimation of the effect of variables
that vary in a predictable way, such as age, is difficult to be estimated with precision,
since the estimation relies only on non linear terms.
3.2 Estimation results
We turn now to the application of these methodologies on our sample. First of all, we
consider only the time period going from 2004 to 2014, since the measure on risk aver-
sion is not available for the waves of 1998, 2000 and 2002. From 2004 to 2014, we have
an unbalanced panel of 48,015 observations, of which 30,818 are panel observations.
Though in principle we could use all observations in the pooled logit estimation, we re-
duce our sample to consider only panel households, so to have more comparable results
(at least between the pooled logit and the random effect estimation).
Table 3.1: Panel dimension in the SHIW.
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
1998 3,873 2,591 1,855 1,476 1,284 1,088 915 634
2000 3,605 2,522 1,951 1,682 1,418 1,171 804
2002 3,604 2,623 2,207 1,834 1,511 1,025
2004 3,957 3,202 2,620 2,142 1,420
2006 4,345 3,476 2,790 1,834
2008 4,621 3,596 2,315
2010 4,611 2,894
2012 4,459
Table 3.1 shows the size of the panel component across years. Remarkably, there are
1,420 households that have been observed in each of the six waves between 2004 and
2014. To perform our econometric analysis we drop those observation for which there
has been a change in the household head. In this way our sample reduces to 29,645
observations. Table 3.2 shows the results of the estimation of the probability of owning
risky liquid assets using the pooled logit model. Before comparing such estimates with
the ones from other models, we are concerned about the role of wealth in the regression.
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As it is clear from the discussion in chapter 1, wealth is strongly correlated with risky
assets participation and with many of our explanatory variables. For this reason, we are
interested in estimating the effects of the other independent variables controlling also
for wealth, so to isolate their effect at a given level of wealth. However, wealth might
correlate with the error term if investing in the risky assets favors the accumulation
of wealth, this may happen, for example, if participants benefit of a higher rate on
return on wealth than non participants. For this reason, table 3.2 presents three different
specifications: one in which wealth is not included, one in which we include quartiles
of total net wealth and a third one in which we include quartiles of net wealth excluding
the amount invested in risky assets.
From the table, we first of all notice that in the three specifications there are some
common factors that strongly predict participation, in line with the implications of the-
oretical models. Risk aversion has a strong negative effect on the probability to invest,
as well as family size. The more conservative investment strategy of families with more
members appears in line with theories of precautionary saving, as these households
are likely to need a greater safe buffer stock in order to cope with unexpected shocks.
Education, income and wealth are strongly correlated with participation, while the co-
efficients of age and age squared imply the hump shaped participation profile in age that
we have highlighted in chapter one. We notice also that households with a female head
tends to participate less to the stock market. Finally, participation is higher in the North,
especially in the North East, and lower in the Center, the South and in the Islands. In-
terestingly, such geographic differences remain strong even after controlling for wealth.
Considering the time effects, we see that the coefficients are negative and significant
in each year with respect to 2004, except 2006. We see that 2008, 2012 and 2014 are
the years in which the probability of participating was lower. This show once again the
strong relationship between wealth and investment in risky assets, as from figure 1.1 we
see that these are also the years in which the drop in net wealth has been most severe.
Between the three regressions we notice also some interesting differences, especially for
what regards the effect of housing on participation. Indeed, the first column predicts a
negative effect on participation for those who owns their house with a mortgage, renters
and those who live in their house for free or through a usufruct agreement with respect
to outright home owners. However, once we control for wealth, the coefficients of non
home owners categories change their sign, and become positive. Intuitively, non home
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Table 3.2: Pooled logistic regressions for risky liquid assets.
Risky liquid assets ownership1 β SE β SE β SE
No tolerance for risk -0.501*** [0.0418] -0.469*** [0.0424] -0.485*** [0.0420]
Age 0.0657*** [0.0127] 0.0500*** [0.0130] 0.0579*** [0.0128]
Age squared -0.000513*** [0.000107] -0.000412*** [0.000110] -0.000466*** [0.000108]
Female -0.216** [0.0706] -0.169* [0.0723] -0.188** [0.0715]
Family size -0.262*** [0.0268] -0.231*** [0.0267] -0.247*** [0.0266]
Housing status
Owner with mortgage -0.339*** [0.0778] -0.145 [0.0785] -0.222** [0.0781]
Renter -0.518*** [0.0922] 0.803*** [0.116] 0.19 [0.114]
Usufruct/free -0.257* [0.103] 0.844*** [0.121] 0.354** [0.116]
Education
Secondary 0.717*** [0.0763] 0.622*** [0.0782] 0.666*** [0.0770]
Tertiary 1.203*** [0.0976] 0.965*** [0.0995] 1.058*** [0.0986]
Working status
Self employed 0.136 [0.0758] -0.149 [0.0767] -0.0333 [0.0763]
Retired 0.225** [0.0762] 0.185* [0.0774] 0.195* [0.0766]
Other not working 0.269* [0.131] 0.118 [0.134] 0.187 [0.131]
Municipality size
20,000-40,000 0.0669 [0.0718] 0.0835 [0.0729] 0.0655 [0.0720]
40,000-500,000 -0.00349 [0.0623] -0.00841 [0.0634] -0.0137 [0.0627]
>500000 -0.179 [0.105] -0.254* [0.107] -0.233* [0.106]
Income quartile
II 1.055*** [0.112] 0.731*** [0.113] 0.919*** [0.113]
III 1.889*** [0.114] 1.281*** [0.115] 1.607*** [0.117]
IV 2.823*** [0.120] 1.899*** [0.121] 2.346*** [0.124]
Year
2006 -0.145** [0.0536] -0.140* [0.0555] -0.135* [0.0544]
2008 -0.323*** [0.0556] -0.336*** [0.0574] -0.328*** [0.0564]
2010 -0.286*** [0.0587] -0.263*** [0.0605] -0.271*** [0.0595]
2012 -0.318*** [0.0616] -0.337*** [0.0630] -0.318*** [0.0621]
2014 -0.408*** [0.0670] -0.397*** [0.0688] -0.395*** [0.0677]
Area of residence
North East 0.345*** [0.0664] 0.332*** [0.0676] 0.336*** [0.0668]
Center -0.196** [0.0690] -0.304*** [0.0697] -0.265*** [0.0693]
South -1.469*** [0.0977] -1.497*** [0.0971] -1.491*** [0.0969]
Islands -1.063*** [0.114] -1.021*** [0.115] -1.042*** [0.114]
Total net wealth 2
II 1.731*** [0.133]
III 2.170*** [0.146]
IV 3.050*** [0.150]
Net wealth excl. risky assets 3
II 0.746*** [0.116]
III 0.948*** [0.128]
IV 1.508*** [0.133]
Constant -4.565*** [0.386] -5.802*** [0.406] -5.073*** [0.391]
Observations 29,645 29,645 29,645
Pseudo R-squared 0.244 0.278 0.255
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
In all regressions standard errors are clustered at the household level.
1 Risky financial assets include risky liquid assets plus non listed shares, other financial assets and defined contribution
pension plan and other financial assets.
2 Quartiles of total net wealth.
3 Quartiles of net wealth excluding risky assets.
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owners are on average much poorer than homeowners, so when we do not control for
wealth, the negative effect on the probability to invest in risky assets is mainly driven
by this difference in wealth. Owning the house with a mortgage, instead, still has a
negative effect on participation.
Hence, controlling for wealth allows to a cleaner estimation of the effects of vari-
ables such as housing or working status that are much correlated with wealth. Surpris-
ingly, the standard errors are generally greater in the second and third specifications
than in the first. Regarding the predictive power of the regression, inserting the quartiles
of net wealth on the right hand side improves the R2 from 0.24 to 0.275 in the second
column, and 0.251 in the third. In the following we choose to follow our third specifica-
tion: indeed, considering a measure of wealth that includes risky assets in its definition
raises strong endogeneity concerns, hence, excluding the value of those assets seems to
be a safer choice.
In table 3.3 we compare the results of the pooled logistic regression with a random
and a fixed effect model. Columns 1 and 2 present the pooled logit model, and cor-
respond to columns 5 and 6 of table 3.2. Columns 3 and 4 correspond to the random
effects model described above, where, conditional on a normally distributed individual
effect, the time varying disturbances are independently distributed according to a lo-
gistic cumulative function. The results obtained with the random effect model largely
confirm the evidences from the pooled logit model. To truly compare the coefficients
across the two models, we should focus on ratios rather than on absolute values. For
example, in both specifications being in the top quartile of wealth has an effect approx-
imatively double than being in the second quartile. Proportionally to the coefficient of
risk aversion, we find much larger effects of gender, family size and education in the
random effects framework than in the pooled logit estimates. The pattern of coefficients
for income and real and non risky financial wealth quartiles is very similar, as well as
for the year effects. At the bottom of the table, we report also the estimated values of
σα, the estimated variance of the individual effect, and for ρ =
σ2α
1 + σ2α
. A likelihood
ratio test strongly reject the null hypothesis of ρ = 0. If ρ is equal to zero, then individ-
ual variance component is negligible, and the random effect model is equivalent to the
pooled estimator. Thus, the likelihood ratio test formally tests the difference between
the two models. Finally, in columns 5 and 6 we report conditional logit estimate. The
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Table 3.3: Logistic regressions for risky liquid assets ownership.
Pooled Random effect Fixed effect
Risky liquid assets ownership1 β SE β SE β SE
No tolerance for risk -0.485*** [0.0420] -0.464*** [0.0539] -0.217*** [0.0600]
Age 0.0579*** [0.0128] 0.119*** [0.0185] 0.0780* [0.0350]
Age squared -0.000466*** [0.000108] -0.000956*** [0.000154] -0.000969** [0.000298]
Female -0.188** [0.0715] -0.421*** [0.101]
Family size -0.247*** [0.0266] -0.307*** [0.0359] -0.0289 [0.0668]
Housing status
Owner with mortgage -0.222** [0.0781] -0.134 [0.101] 0.151 [0.130]
Renter 0.19 [0.114] 0.122 [0.144] 0.571* [0.240]
Usufruct/free 0.354** [0.116] 0.289* [0.143] -0.0807 [0.187]
Education
Secondary 0.666*** [0.0770] 1.058*** [0.105]
Tertiary 1.058*** [0.0986] 1.904*** [0.145]
Working status
Self employed -0.0333 [0.0763] 0.071 [0.104] 0.0595 [0.163]
Retired 0.195* [0.0766] 0.336*** [0.102] 0.396** [0.142]
Other not working 0.187 [0.131] 0.467** [0.180] 0.886*** [0.240]
Municipality size
20,000-40,000 0.0655 [0.0720] 0.0644 [0.105]
40,000-500,000 -0.0137 [0.0627] -0.044 [0.0899]
>500000 -0.233* [0.106] -0.444** [0.159]
Income quartile
II 0.919*** [0.113] 1.093*** [0.134] 0.490** [0.165]
III 1.607*** [0.117] 1.952*** [0.141] 0.865*** [0.180]
IV 2.346*** [0.124] 2.932*** [0.152] 1.370*** [0.195]
Year
2006 -0.135* [0.0544] -0.275*** [0.0795] -0.202* [0.0834]
2008 -0.328*** [0.0564] -0.523*** [0.0812] -0.286** [0.0941]
2010 -0.271*** [0.0595] -0.435*** [0.0824] -0.123 [0.106]
2012 -0.318*** [0.0621] -0.553*** [0.0855] -0.134 [0.123]
2014 -0.395*** [0.0677] -0.671*** [0.0936] -0.159 [0.143]
Area of residence
North East 0.336*** [0.0668] 0.448*** [0.101]
Center -0.265*** [0.0693] -0.437*** [0.104]
South -1.491*** [0.0969] -2.308*** [0.137]
Islands -1.042*** [0.114] -1.709*** [0.155]
Net wealth excl. risky assets 2
II 0.746*** [0.116] 0.909*** [0.138] 0.397* [0.175]
III 0.948*** [0.128] 1.207*** [0.156] 0.433* [0.195]
IV 1.508*** [0.133] 1.865*** [0.163] 0.653** [0.208]
Constant -5.073*** [0.391] -8.296*** [0.583]
ρ 0.57 0.0124
σα 2.087 0.0528
LR H0 : ρ = 0 (p-value) 0.0
Observations 29,645 29,645 7,569
Pseudo R-squared 0.255 0.034
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
In the pooled regression standard errors are clustered at the household level.
1 Risky financial assets include risky liquid assets plus non listed shares, other financial assets and defined contribution
pension plan and other financial assets.
2 Quartiles of net wealth excluding risky assets.
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sample size is reduced to the 7,569 observations of households for which there are tran-
sitions. With respect to the random effect model, here we allow αi to depend on the
explanatory variables. As it is clear from the discussion above, the parameters of all
time invariant variables cannot be identified. We still find the same pattern of coeffi-
cients on risk aversion, income and wealth, even though the coefficients for quartiles II
and III of wealth are less significant than in the other models. In line with the finding
of Miniaci and Weber (2002), the coefficient on age is not precisely estimated, as well
as the time effects. The coefficient of age squared, instead, is very similar to the one of
the random effect model. Moreover, we decided to include variables such as family size
and housing status but the effects of those variables is not clearly identified. This may
be due to the fact that there is not enough variability in these variables. Coherently with
the other models, being self employed does not have an effect different from being an
employee. In the conditional logit, however, we find a stronger positive effect of being
neither working nor retired, which we have difficulty in explaining. The explanatory
power of this model is apparently very low, with a pseudo R2 equal to 0.034, compared
to the one of 0.251 in the pooled model.
With respect to this analysis, a crucial point is to understand the effects that the
severance pay reform could have on household portfolio allocation. Indeed, our choice
of focusing on liquid risky assets only could cause a bias in our results. As we have
highlighted in the previous chapter, after the 2007 reform many households have seen
their severance pay transferred to a private pension plan. Our concern is that households
have adjusted their portfolio to respond to the increased riskiness of their saving for re-
tirement. Hence, this could explain the low participation rates observed in risky liquid
assets. Our thesis is that such a crowding out effect is not present, or at least is not so
strong, for a number of reasons. First of all, as highlighted in chapter one, the decline
in participation is observed since 2002 onwards, so it starts before the reform. Second,
in chapter two we showed that there was a diffused ignorance about the characteris-
tics of investment in these employee-sponsored pension plan. Third, the mechanism of
"silenzio-assenso", combined with the "previdential illiteracy", may have caused that
many households entered the new severance pay regime without even being aware. A
first reassuring evidence is that the boom in the number of participants is observed in
2010 and not in 2008, suggesting that when the reform took effectiveness many house-
holds were not aware of the change. As a further check, we repeat the same estimations
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Table 3.4: Logistic regressions for risky assets ownership.
Pooled Random effect Fixed effect
Risky assets ownership1 β SE β SE β SE
No tolerance for risk -0.281*** [0.0370] -0.234*** [0.0454] -0.0437 [0.0510]
Age 0.0526*** [0.0107] 0.117*** [0.0147] 0.201*** [0.0299]
Age squared -0.000512*** [0.0000926] -0.00108*** [0.000126] -0.00194*** [0.000258]
Female -0.192** [0.0599] -0.353*** [0.0810]
Family size -0.162*** [0.0220] -0.159*** [0.0283] 0.0719 [0.0543]
Housing status
Owner with mortgage -0.0466 [0.0649] 0.0723 [0.0833] 0.227* [0.110]
Renter 0.194* [0.0928] 0.117 [0.115] 0.428* [0.192]
Usufruct/free 0.428*** [0.0927] 0.402*** [0.115] 0.136 [0.154]
Education
Secondary 0.590*** [0.0651] 0.849*** [0.0854]
Tertiary 0.856*** [0.0860] 1.399*** [0.121]
Working status
Self employed -0.358*** [0.0653] -0.443*** [0.0873] -0.290* [0.143]
Retired -0.303*** [0.0660] -0.410*** [0.0860] -0.194 [0.124]
Other not working -0.304** [0.109] -0.362** [0.139] -0.0434 [0.181]
Municipality size
20,000-40,000 0.0262 [0.0615] 0.0349 [0.0862]
40,000-500,000 -0.0426 [0.0523] -0.0958 [0.0735]
>500000 -0.228* [0.0910] -0.377** [0.129]
Income quartile
II 0.730*** [0.0792] 0.801*** [0.0950] 0.325** [0.117]
III 1.307*** [0.0834] 1.526*** [0.101] 0.693*** [0.130]
IV 1.950*** [0.0906] 2.335*** [0.112] 1.102*** [0.146]
Year
2006 -0.145** [0.0495] -0.247*** [0.0704] -0.241** [0.0743]
2008 -0.279*** [0.0520] -0.417*** [0.0714] -0.337*** [0.0841]
2010 0.146** [0.0536] 0.203** [0.0711] 0.283** [0.0947]
2012 0.0502 [0.0556] 0.052 [0.0736] 0.207 [0.111]
2014 -0.014 [0.0601] -0.00936 [0.0797] 0.206 [0.130]
Area of residence
North East 0.617*** [0.0590] 0.849*** [0.0861]
Center -0.00038 [0.0608] -0.0318 [0.0873]
South -1.065*** [0.0732] -1.558*** [0.102]
Islands -0.796*** [0.0882] -1.231*** [0.119]
Net wealth excl. risky assets 2
II 0.562*** [0.0863] 0.551*** [0.104] 0.082 [0.130]
III 0.753*** [0.0995] 0.801*** [0.120] 0.153 [0.150]
IV 1.274*** [0.105] 1.465*** [0.127] 0.522** [0.161]
Constant -3.816*** [0.321] -6.328*** [0.451]
ρ 0.502 0.0119
σα 1.821 0.0433
LR H0 : ρ = 0 (p-value) 0.0
Observations 29,645 29,645 10,219
Pseudo R-squared 0.238 0.041
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
In the pooled regression standard errors are clustered at the household level.
1 Risky financial assets comprise long term government bonds, other bonds, listed shares, mutual funds, managed
accounts and voultary/occupational pension plans.
2 Quartiles of net wealth excluding risky assets.
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Figure 3.1: Participation rates and median net wealth by working status and year.
(a) Participation rate in liquid risky assets.
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(b) Median net wealth, thousands of euros.
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Wealth deflated by the consumer price index (2014 = 1, source: Istat),
statistics computed using survey weights.
of table 3.3 for ownership of risky assets including pensions in table 3.4. The regression
results show the same patterns of coefficients for risk aversion, age, sex, family size, in-
come, wealth, area of residence and municipality size, largely confirming our previous
analysis. Also the relationship between the three models is very similar. One notably
difference is that the coefficient on risk aversion is no longer significant in the condi-
tional logit specification. The most interesting evidences, however, regard the parameter
for housing and working status of the reference person. Indeed, the effect of the reform
on employee with respect to other work categories is very evident, and the coefficients
for self-employed, retired and other not working are all negative and strongly signifi-
cant. We notice also that the coefficient for being home owners with a mortgage on the
main residence change sign with respect to table 3.3, even if it is not significant here.
This is probably correlated to the fact that households with a mortgage are likely to be
employee with a regular income source. These results reinforce our argument that the
investment in complementary pensions following the reform has to be considered with
care and, at least in part, it is not the result of a specific portfolio choice of the house-
holds. Figure 3.1 shows the participation rate in risky liquid assets (3.2a) and median net
wealth (3.2b) by the working status of the reference person across the years. From the
figure we see that the pattern of participation after 2008 is not particularly different for
employee, as we would expect if the crowding out effect of the severance pay reform
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was there. Moreover, we see that across the four categories, all experienced a sharp
drop in median net wealth between 2006 and 2014. The drop is especially striking for
what concerns households whose head is nor working neither retired; from table 1.1 we
see that the fraction of these households increased from 4.9% of the sample in 2006 to
9.5% in 2009. If such crowding out effects of investment in pension funds was present,
we should expect to see a sharper decrease of the participation rate for employee with
respect to the other categories. From the evidences presented so far, this does not seem
to be the case. We have to remind, however, that the reform took effectiveness in 2007,
thus its effects may be confounded with effects of the 2007-2008 financial crisis.
3.3 Accounting for stock market entry and exit
In this last section we want to study the determinants of the decisions to entry or exit
the stock market. We will carry out such analysis over two different time frame: the
period 2006-2010 and the period 2010-2014. We choose to focus on four years time
windows instead of narrower two years windows so to capture more transitions in the
participation status. In order to understand the factors that drive entries, exits and inertia
in participation, we employ a bivariate probit following Bilias et al. (2010), in which we
simultaneously consider the participation decision in two consecutive periods. In gen-
eral, accounting for the participation decision dynamically is particularly challenging,
as it usually requires long panel data series. If there is true state dependance, that is
γ 6= 0 in equation (3.19), or the uit are serially correlated, then past ownership influ-
ences actual ownership. Miniaci and Weber (2002) note how in the estimation of such a
model two central issues arise. First, the assumptions made concerning the initial condi-
tions are crucial to obtain consistent estimates. Such problem may be circumvented by
assuming that the initial conditions are exogenous or that the process is in equilibrium
at time 0. Clearly, this may be problematic if the underlying process is evolving. The
second problem that arises in estimating these dynamic models is related to distinguish
between true and spurious state dependence. In particular, time dependence may be due
to the fact that actual experience of ownership has modified individual behaviour, or to
the presence of unobserved components, or due to both. Since the unobserved individ-
ual effects persist over time, there is a serial correlation in the residuals, which does
not allow to distinguish true state dependence from spurious state dependence. Miniaci
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and Weber (2002) show how the estimator suggested by Honoré and Kyriazidou (2000)
generalizes the conditional logit model to the case in which there is true state depen-
dence. In this case Si =
∑T
t=1 is no longer a sufficient statistic for the fixed unobserved
effect αi, and a consistent estimation requires at least four observations. Instead, using a
bivariate probit model has a few advantages: it is a relatively simple model which allow
to test for the correlation in the decision to participate in two different moments. Thus,
the bivariate probit seems to be a convenient compromise to study jointly the ownership
decision in two consecutive periods.
Again, we base our theoretical description on Greene (2003). We specify the general
bivariate probit model as
y∗1 = x
′
1β1 + 1, y1 = 1 if y
∗
1 > 0, 0 otherwise,
y∗2 = x
′
2β2 + 2, y2 = 1 if y
∗
2 > 0, 0 otherwise,
E[1|x1, x2] = E[2|x1, x2] = 0,
Var[1|x1, x2] = Var[2|x1, x2] = 1,
Cov[1, 2|x1, x2] = ρ.
(3.41)
The key assumption is that the errors of the two equations are jointly normally dis-
tributed. We allow the disturbances, and, thus, the two outcome variables, to have a
correlation ρ. If ρ is equal to zero, then yi1 and yi2 are independent, and they could be
studied individually using a univariate probit model. Given the joint normality assump-
tion, the bivariate normal cumulative density function is given by
Pr (X1 < x1, X2 < x2) = Φ2 (x1, x2, ρ) =
∫ x2
−∞
∫ x1
−∞
φ2 (z1, z1, ρ) dz1dz2, (3.42)
where the subscript 2 on Φ2 and φ2 denotes the bivariate distribution. The density
function is
φ2(x1, x2, ρ) =
e−(1/2)(x
2
1+x
2
2−2ρx1x2)(1−ρ2)
2pi(1− ρ2)1/2 . (3.43)
In order to construct the log likelihood function, we define qi1 = 2yi1 − 1 and qi2 =
2yi2− 1, so that qij = 1 if yij = 1 and qij = −1 if yij = 0, for j = 1, 2. Now we denote
zij = x
′
ijβj and wij = qijzij, j + 1, 2, (3.44)
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and
ρi∗ = qi1qi2ρ. (3.45)
Such notational arrangements are necessary in order to account for all the sign changes
needed to compute probabilities for the four combinations of zero and one of yi1 and
yi2. Such probabilities enter the likelihood function, and are defined by
Pr (Y1 = yi1, Y2 = yi2|x1, x2) = Φ2 (wi1, wi2, ρi∗) . (3.46)
Thus, the log likelihood function is written as
ln L =
n∑
i=1
ln Φ2 (wi1, wi2, ρi∗) . (3.47)
To obtain the maximum likelihood estimate, we need to set the three partial derivatives
∂ln L/∂βj , ∂ln L/∂ρ equal to zero, while the variance matrix is estimated from the
second derivatives, as shown in Greene (2003).
We now present the results of the estimation. Table 3.1 shows the panel dimension
and composition in the various waves. We see that our two samples include 3,476 and
2,894 households observed in the periods 2006-2010 and 2010-2014, respectively. Table
3.5 shows the transitions between participation and non participation of risky liquid
assets between each year. In particular, we notice that there is a considerable degree
of inertia across the years, especially considering 2-years transitions. In our sample,
79% and 82% of the sample did not switch between ownership and non ownership in
2006-2010 and in 2010-2014 (and viceversa).
Table 3.6 and 3.7 show the average marginal effects obtained from the bivariate
probit estimation of risky liquid asset ownership 2006-2010, and in 2010-2014, respec-
tively. Such effects represent the derivatives of Pr (y1 = 1, y2 = 1|x1, x2), computed at
each single observation and then averaged across the sample. Bilias et al. (2010) note
that such methodology provides more realistic and economically relevant interpretation
with respect to, for example, marginal effects computed at means or at other relevant
values of the dependent variables 3. The results presented in table 3.6 and 3.7 overall
3Differently from Bilias et al. (2010), we can avoid to compute the marginal effects manually for each
observation, and then average them across the sample, thanks to the command margins introduced in
Stata 13.
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Table 3.5: Transition probabilities for risky liquid assets ownership across the years.
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
1998 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0.59 0.13 0.59 0.12 0.55 0.13 0.55 0.12 0.56 0.11 0.53 0.13 0.52 0.21 0.54 0.14
1 0.09 0.19 0.10 0.20 0.11 0.21 0.14 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.19 0.16 0.25 0.15 0.17
2000 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0.59 0.08 0.55 0.10 0.55 0.09 0.55 0.09 0.52 0.11 0.51 0.12 0.51 0.12
1 0.11 0.22 0.12 0.23 0.15 0.21 0.17 0.20 0.15 0.22 0.17 0.20 0.18 0.19
2002 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0.61 0.10 0.60 0.10 0.60 0.08 0.56 0.12 0.56 0.12 0.56 0.12
1 0.09 0.20 0.12 0.19 0.13 0.18 0.13 0.19 0.13 0.20 0.14 0.18
2004 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0.63 0.08 0.61 0.09 0.57 0.13 0.56 0.13 0.58 0.13
1 0.11 0.17 0.13 0.17 0.12 0.18 0.13 0.17 0.13 0.16
2006 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0.67 0.07 0.61 0.13 0.59 0.13 0.61 0.13
1 0.08 0.17 0.09 0.18 0.10 0.18 0.10 0.16
2008 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0.64 0.12 0.62 0.13 0.63 0.12
1 0.06 0.18 0.08 0.17 0.09 0.16
2010 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0.61 0.09 0.62 0.09
1 0.10 0.21 0.10 0.20
2012 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0.64 0.08
1 0.09 0.19
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Table 3.6: Bivariate participation probit, 2006-2010.
Participation in risky liquid assets 1
Own in 2006 Own in 2010
Marginal effect SE Marginal effect SE
No tolerance for risk -0.0171*** [0.00499] -0.0263*** [0.00462]
Age 0.00224 [0.00148] 0.00292* [0.00131]
Age squared -0.0000182 [0.0000119] -0.0000253* [0.0000114]
Female -0.00346 [0.00704] -0.00843 [0.00654]
Family size -0.0120*** [0.00278] -0.0119*** [0.00243]
Housing status
Owner with mortgage 0.0117 [0.0129] 0.0103 [0.00792]
Renter 0.0272 [0.0182] 0.0379*** [0.00772]
Usufruct/free 0.0469* [0.0208] 0.0270** [0.00938]
Education
Secondary 0.0478*** [0.00910] 0.0272*** [0.00675]
Tertiary 0.0888*** [0.0165] 0.0427*** [0.00900]
Working status
Self employed 0.000593 [0.0116] -0.00314 [0.00755]
Retired 0.0206 [0.0121] 0.0107 [0.00724]
Other not working 0.0341 [0.0283] 0.0366*** [0.0105]
Municipality size
20,000-40,000 0.00631 [0.0110] 0.000769 [0.00621]
40,000-500,000 -0.000124 [0.00939] -0.00184 [0.00555]
>500000 0.00274 [0.0168] -0.0091 [0.0103]
Income quartile
II 0.0361*** [0.00730] 0.0382*** [0.00850]
III 0.0840*** [0.00887] 0.0546*** [0.00879]
IV 0.163*** [0.0130] 0.0927*** [0.00961]
Net wealth excl. risky assets 2
II 0.0437*** [0.00949] 0.0338*** [0.00923]
III 0.0640*** [0.0115] 0.0555*** [0.0104]
IV 0.130*** [0.0141] 0.0820*** [0.0108]
Area of residence
North East 0.0761*** [0.0132] 0.0214*** [0.00563]
Center -0.0144 [0.0116] -0.0164* [0.00682]
South -0.0900*** [0.00970] -0.0630*** [0.00819]
Islands -0.0660*** [0.0115] -0.0541*** [0.00924]
ρ 0.601 (SE .0284)
Wald H0 : ρ = 0 (p-value) 0.0
Observations 3266
Robust standard errors, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
1 Risky financial assets include risky liquid assets plus non listed shares, other financial assets
and defined contribution pension plan and other financial assets.
2 Quartiles of net wealth excluding risky assets.
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Table 3.7: Bivariate participation probit, 2010-2014.
Participation in risky liquid assets 1
Own in 2010 Own in 2014
Marginal effect SE Marginal effect SE
No tolerance for risk -0.0345*** [0.00507] -0.0246*** [0.00468]
Age 0.0012 [0.00158] 0.00223 [0.00137]
Age squared -0.00000893 [0.0000126] -0.0000193 [0.0000117]
Female -0.00368 [0.00738] -0.00935 [0.00672]
Family size -0.0118*** [0.00274] -0.0101*** [0.00252]
Housing status
Owner with mortgage -0.0199 [0.0116] -0.00461 [0.00721]
Renter -0.000653 [0.0191] 0.0031 [0.0116]
Usufruct/free 0.0500* [0.0239] 0.0337*** [0.00838]
Education
Secondary 0.0409*** [0.01000] 0.0187* [0.00732]
Tertiary 0.0606*** [0.0157] 0.0293** [0.00941]
Working status
Self employed 0.00862 [0.0119] 0.00601 [0.00727]
Retired 0.0172 [0.0126] 0.0150* [0.00755]
Other not working 0.0289 [0.0249] 0.0201 [0.0114]
Municipality size
20,000-40,000 0.00819 [0.0117] 0.00281 [0.00668]
40,000-500,000 0.00991 [0.00997] 0.00266 [0.00562]
>500000 -0.0207 [0.0160] -0.00256 [0.0105]
Income quartile
II 0.0258*** [0.00717] 0.0172 [0.00925]
III 0.0657*** [0.00880] 0.0549*** [0.00948]
IV 0.155*** [0.0137] 0.0815*** [0.0105]
Net wealth excl. risky assets 2
II 0.0470*** [0.0108] 0.0394*** [0.0112]
III 0.0595*** [0.0128] 0.0432** [0.0133]
IV 0.105*** [0.0147] 0.0695*** [0.0135]
Area of residence
North East 0.0359* [0.0150] 0.0229*** [0.00640]
Center -0.0179 [0.0137] 0.00401 [0.00684]
South -0.109*** [0.0114] -0.0566*** [0.00846]
Islands -0.0737*** [0.0139] -0.0341*** [0.00907]
ρ 0.6002 (SE .0323)
Wald H0 : ρ = 0 (p-value) 0.0
Observations 2696
Robust standard errors, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
1 Risky financial assets include risky liquid assets plus non listed shares, other financial assets and
defined contribution pension plan and other financial assets.
2 Quartiles of net wealth excluding risky assets.
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support the results of the static participation analysis of the previous section. In particu-
lar, the probability of owning risky assets in both period increases with wealth, income
and education, and is higher for households living in the North with respect to the South
and the Islands. Curiously, there are no differences between Center and North West. On
the other side, risk aversion and family size maintain their negative effects on risky liq-
uid assets ownership. The results suggest evidences of inertia in participation status: ρ
is estimated to be around 0.6, and it is slightly higher for what regards the period 2010-
2014. We test the significance of this correlation with a Wald test, and in both periods
the null hypothesis of ρ = 0 is strongly rejected. There are also interesting differences,
however, across the specification: for example, renting the main residence or being nei-
ther working nor retired in 2010, increase the probability of participating in 2010, but
these factors does not have a significant effect on ownership probability in 2006. From
our bivariate probit analysis also emerges that there are no differences in participation
behaviour on the basis of the size of the municipality in which the household lives.
As noted by Greene (2003), however, such marginal effects are unconditional, that
is, they do not correspond to a regression coefficient or a slope of a conditional ex-
pectations. Formally, these average marginal effects may be defined as follows: from
equation (3.46), given our definitions of qij and zij, we have that
Pr (y1, y2|x1, x2) = Φ2 (w1, w2, ρi∗) = Φ2 (x′1β1, x′2β2, ρ) . (3.48)
Hence, the marginal effects of x1 may be computed as
∂Φ2 (x
′
1β1, x
′
2β2, ρ)
∂x1
= φ(x′1β1)Φ
(
x′2β2 − ρx′1β1√
1− ρ2
)
. (3.49)
Note that in (3.48) and (3.49) the household subscript i is omitted for simplicity, and
that φ and Φ denote the univariate normal density and cumulative density function,
respectively. In our case, we are interested in the probabilities of entry or exit, that is
Pr (yt+4 = 1|yt = 0, xt+4, xt) in the case of entry,
Pr (yt+4 = 0|yt = 1, xt+4, xt) in the case of exit,
(3.50)
where t = 2006, 2010. Applying the Bayes’ theorem, such conditional probabilities can
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Figure 3.3: Conditional probabilities of entry and exit, by net wealth quartiles.
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Top panel refers to the period 2006-2010, bottom panel to 2010-2014.
be computed as
Pr (yt+4 = 1|yt = 0, xt+4, xt) = Pr (yt+4 = 1, yt = 0|xt+4, xt)Pr (yt = 0|xt+4, xt) . (3.51)
Hence we can compute the conditional probabilities of investing and not investing, given
the participation status in the previous period. Figure 3.3 shows the probabilities of risk
liquid asset ownership and non ownership in 2010 (2014), conditional on participation
status in 2006 (2010). The pattern across wealth quartiles is very similar in both the
periods observed. For what concerns those who were not participating in the first period,
we see that inertia is very common. The probability of entering the market increases
with net wealth, but even for those in the top quartile is slightly above 20% in 2010
and it is lower in 2014. For households at the bottom of the wealth distribution, such
probability is as low as 5% in 2010 and around 3% in 2014. The charts on the right side,
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Figure 3.5: Conditional probabilities of entry and exit, by education level of the reference person.
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Top panel refers to the period 2006-2010, bottom panel to 2010-2014.
instead, show probabilities of exit, that is, the probability of not participating conditional
on participating in the previous period. There we observe very high probabilities of
exiting the market, both in 2010 and 2014. With the exception of households in the
top net wealth quartile, these probabilities exceed 50%. That means that households are
more likely to exit the stock market than staying in. At every level of wealth, we observe
that the probabilities of entries (exits) are lower (higher) in 2014. Such results are
strongly at odds with the results of Bilias et al. (2010), who document substantial inertia
among both participants and non participants, for example, they report a probability of
exit between 1999 and 2003 (notice that the time span includes the burst of the dot come
bubble) around 25% for the 75th percentile of net wealth.
Similarly, figure 3.5 shows the same conditional probabilities by the level of the
educational attainment of the reference person. Overall, we again observe very low
probabilities of entry and high probabilities of exit. For households whose head has a
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Figure 3.7: Conditional probabilities of entry and exit, by age of the reference person.
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Top panel refers to the period 2006-2010, bottom panel to 2010-2014.
low level of education we observe probabilities of entry around 6% between 2006 and
2010, and lower than 5% in the period 2010-2014, and probabilities of exiting close
to 70 and 75%, respectively. We see also a sharp decline (rise) in the probability of
entry (exit) between 2010-2014 with respect to the previous four years, at each level of
educational attainment.
Finally, we show these probabilities by age of the reference person in figure 3.7. In
line with the other figures, the likelihood of entry is lower between 2010 and 2014, and,
conversely, the likelihood of exit is higher. Once again, we observe the hump-shaped
relationship between risky asset participation and age: the probabilities of entry are
hump-shaped in age, and the highest are estimated for the 46-60 age group (in both pe-
riods). Conversely, exit probabilities are u-shaped, with youngest and oldest households
that are more likely to dismiss their investments in risky assets. Such probabilities, how-
ever, exceed 50% in each age group. One interesting fact to point out regards the change
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occurred in entry probabilities between the two periods. As can be seen from figure 3.7,
the drop in these probabilities between the first and the second period has been much
more pronounced for young households (especially those whose head is aged between
31 and 45) than for older ones (specifically, those aged 61-75).
The magnitude of these results is surprising. However, is is coherent with the data
and potentially with the factors that we discussed in the previous chapter. First of all,
we documented that 2012 and 2014 saw the largest drop in real household wealth, and
this already can in part explain households’ particularly negative attitude towards risky
investment between 2010 and 2014. We may also argue that the 2007-2008 financial
crisis impacted the level of trust in the financial system, which subsequently worsened
due to the prolonged economic depression, and the even harder shocks that hit the econ-
omy during and after the sovereign debt crisis of 2011-2012. These effects seem very
large and widespread across households, at every level of wealth, education and age.
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4Concluding remarks
In this thesis we have analyzed Italian household financial investments and risk taking
behaviour over the last 15 years. We focused in particular on two features of the data:
the low participation rate in risky assets and the sharp decline of this participation rate
observed since the 2001 shock market crash. Our empirical analysis shows that poorer,
less educated and more risk averse households are less likely to invest in risky assets.
Furthermore, these households have a higher probability to have exited the stock market
during and after the Great Recession. However, our findings point out that the drop in
participation has been pronounced also for wealthier and better educated households.
In order to explain these evidences, we theoretically discussed several factors that have
been considered in the literature, and we analyzed the extent to which these factors can
explain the observed trend. First of all, we claim that a drop in wealth, given the fixed
participation cost, has reduced the benefits achievable from investing in risky assets. But
fixed costs should be implausibly high in order to explain the low participation observed
even at high levels of wealth. Hence, we need to resort to other explanations. We con-
jectured that a decline in the level of trust significantly reduced household propensity to
invest in risky assets. Following Guiso et al. (2008) we have shown formally the effects
of lower trust on risk taking. Given the fixed participation costs, a lower level of trust in-
creases the wealth threshold that triggers non participation and reduces the optimal share
invested upon participation. We also simulated a portfolio choice model in which an ex-
pected utility maximizing investor with CRRA utility function allocates her wealth into
a risky and a risk-free asset. The investor faces fixed participation costs and has limited
trust, which is modeled as a subjective probability of being cheated in the stock market.
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The simulation results show that the negative effect of mistrust on investment in risky
assets is amplified in the presence of participation costs. We also showed that higher
levels of risk aversion or lower expectations on the risk-adjusted equity premium would
have similar effects on participation and on the share invested. Risk aversion could have
increased because background risk rose due to the crisis. Or expected returns could
have been revised downwards. Unfortunately, the available individual-level data on ex-
pected returns do not cover the pre-crisis period, so we could not provide evidence on
their role. Further research effort should be devoted to disentangle these factors and to
evaluate their effects separately. This is a challenging task, for a number of reasons.
First, there is a lack of data on trust and expectations. Second, effectively estimating
background risk is difficult. Indeed, as we highlighted in our discussion, many different
factors can be a source of background risk and increase household risk aversion. Future
research projects should focus especially on the role of unemployment, housing and
macroeconomic experiences in affecting household attitude towards risky investment.
In a broader perspective, understanding how households invest their savings has sev-
eral important implications also for public policy. In particular, it may shed light on the
dynamics of wealth accumulation and inequality. Indeed, if those households who in-
vest in the stock market achieve a higher rate of return, as a result inequality may widen.
This is the point made by Piketty (2014): to use his terminology, if the rate of return on
capital exceeds economic growth, then inequality will inevitably rise, given that only a
fraction of households benefits from this excess return. Using detailed administrative
data on Swedish households, Bach et al. (2015) show that wealthier households achieve
a higher return mainly due to the their higher exposure to systemic risk, given that they
hold, on average, more equity and private businesses. Further evidences of the potential
distributional consequences of asset prices inflation come from Adam and Tzamourani
(2016). Using HFCS data, they show that only a few households would benefit from
equity and bond price increases, while, instead, the median household would strongly
benefit from an increase in house prices. Thus, further developments of the present work
would link household portfolios to the dynamics of wealth accumulation and inequality
in Italy.
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Appendix
The imputation of missing data
The Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) provides detailed information on
a sample of about 8,000 Italian households demographic characteristics and financial
situation. The Survey is conducted by the Bank of Italy through a specialized company
(actually Eurisko), with a biannual frequency, with the exception of a three years gap
between 1995 and 1998.
The questionnaire is organized in 5 section: section A regards household compo-
sition and demographic characteristics, section B contains questions about the labour
status of household components, section C and D provide information of financial and
real estate wealth, respectively, and finally section F regards complementary pension
plans and insurance policies. Other attachments are presents, in which more detailed
questions on specific topics (such as income, real estate ownership) are asked.
The number of financial assets included in the questionnaire progressively increased
throughout the years. In the SHIW, individuals are asked first of all to provide an esti-
mate of the amount invested in a given asset, then if they do not provide this information,
they are asked to select one bracket out of fourteen and subsequently they are asked to
indicate whether the amount is closer to the top, the middle of the bottom point of the
bracket. In the recent waves, after 2006, values are imputed from bracketing directly
by the Bank of Italy, and the data are published without missing observation. For the
waves before 2006 instead, we have to impute the missing values. Following Guiso and
Jappelli (2002), we impute the middle value of the class. This methodology applies well
in this situation, given the high number of classes that are present in the data (14 brack-
ets x 3 subclasses). The estimation of the capital accumulated in pension funds and the
cash value of life insurance is more problematic. For such items, the quality of the data
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is much lower, and many values are missing. Moreover, before 2004 for pension funds
(and 2008 for life insurance policies) the question on the capital was not included in the
survey. We impute such amounts on the basis of the number of years of contribution
and the value of the contribution made during the year. However, we have doubts on
the reliability of such imputation, especially for those households who transferred the
severance pay to a private regime following the 2005 reform.
As we have already mentioned in the text, instead, both the HFCS and the SCF
resort to multiple imputation techniques in order to deal with missing answers. Thus,
we do not need to impute any value. We take into account the multiple imputation when
computing statistics following the methodology described in Rubin (2004).
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